DO SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND NATIONAL CULTURE AFFECT WORK CENTRALITY AND WORK OUTCOMES? A STUDY OF 27 COUNTRIES

By

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Chair







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Abstract

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In this dissertation, I examined the impact of social institutions and national culture on work centrality and work outcomes. Theory provides strong support that both national culture and social institutions should affect work centrality and work outcomes. However, a review of current studies showed a disproportionate emphasis on national culture at the expense of social institutions. The present study was primarily an attempt to fill that void by addressing the importance of social institutions in affecting work centrality and work outcomes.

Using theoretical support from psychology and sociology, I developed hypotheses that reflected that relationships between social institutions and work centrality and work outcomes. For the sake of comparison, I also developed similar hypotheses for national culture variables.

Given that the hypotheses were of a cross-level nature and the many problems associated with the use of more traditional statistical techniques to test

such relationships, a more sophisticated statistical technique was necessary. I used Hierarchical Linear Modeling to test the hypotheses and circumvented the difficulties inherent in multi-level studies.

Results support the basic premise of the dissertation that social institutions have dramatic effects on individual work centrality and work outcomes. However, results rejected all of the national culture hypotheses, implying that social institutions may be as critical in understanding cross-national differences.

This dissertation contributes to the field by showing that traditionally ignored social institutions may be more powerful than the widely studied national culture variables in explaining differences in work centrality and work outcomes. These results suggest that future cross-national studies should take into consideration theoretically relevant social institutions. I also demonstrated the use of Hierarchical Linear Modeling, a novel statistical technique appropriate for cross-level analysis.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The central objective of this dissertation is to examine the effects of social institutions and national culture on work centrality. A secondary objective is to explore the impact of the social institutions and national culture on work outcomes. Work centrality refers to the belief about the value of work in one's life (Kanungo, 1982). Work outcomes pertain to what people hope to achieve through work (e.g., work providing income, work providing contact with other people).

In this dissertation, I adopted the following definitions. A social institution is a "complex of positions, roles, norms, and values lodged in particular types of social structures and organizing relatively stable patterns of human resources with respect to fundamental problems in life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment" (Turner, 1997: 6). A national culture is "the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the member of one human group from another...the interactive aggregate of common characteristics that influences a human group's response to its environment" (Hofstede, 1984: 25).

Why the focus on social institutions and national culture? The prime reason is that theory suggests that both aspects of society affect work centrality and work outcomes. Social institutions, such as education, the economic systems, the level of industrialization, and social inequality, all provide "frameworks of programs or rules" (Jepperson, 1991: 146) that prescribe work

behaviors within certain limits. Through the social norms and values they embody, social institutions govern the directions that societal members deem are worth striving (i.e., whether it is expected that work should be central to one's life or not), and also reinforce these directions through the creation of an expectational bond.

National culture also affects work centrality and functions of work because a national culture is the "central organizing principle of employees' understanding of work, their approach to it, and the way in which they expect to be treated" (Newman & Nollen, 1996). Similarly to social institutions, the values, beliefs, and assumptions ingrained in the national culture guide individuals in terms of whether being involved with work (i.e., more time spent at work compared to other activities) or low work centrality is the right way. These aspects of national culture, manifested in the dimensions identified by Hofstede (1984) (i.e., individualism-collectivism, masculinity-femininity, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance), will provide the preferable way to act or behave.

It should however be noted that the major emphasis of the dissertation is on social institutions. The latter is necessary for various reasons. First, although research shows that some institutions have powerful effects on a number of phenomena, we do not know if social institutions affect levels of work centrality at the individual level for people from different countries. This is surprising given the long standing sociological assumption of linking social institutions with individual-level outcomes (Durkheim, 1982). Second, with the globalization of business (Bartlett & Goshal, 1989; Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991), there is an increasing need

to understand how people from different societies approach work. Third, there is a need to develop alternative models to explain cross-national differences in work-related attitudes and behaviors that adds to the popular cultural frameworks (i.e., primarily Hofstede's [1984]). Given the changes in social institutions at the global level (e.g., the rapid changes in the transition economies or European union grappling with unification, [Scott, 1995]; China changing from a socialist economy to a market economy, [Zhou, Tuma, & Moen, 1997]), there is a need to find macro-level frameworks that go beyond the more static cultural models when examining work-related attitudes. The present study can begin to fill these voids.

Extant Situation

To show the value-added of the present dissertation, I first describe the current situation pertaining to work centrality by discussing two of the most popular approaches and some of their major limitations. I then discuss how the present study can solve some of these major problems.

The study of work centrality has been done mainly in two categories: 1) the cross-cultural approach, and 2) the micro or OB perspective. The only cross-national study that focused on work centrality is the Meaning of Work Study (The Meaning of Working International Research Team [1987]). This research emphasized international differences among a number of variables related to the psychological meaning of working. Building on a theoretical model that stressed individual antecedents (e.g., personal, family situation, present job and career history, and societal norms about working), the Meaning of Working International Research Team (1987) collected data from respondents in eight countries to

study the impact of the above antecedents on a number of "central variables" (e.g., work centrality, valued work outcomes, importance of work goals). Results supported the assertion that work patterns differ between countries.

The Meaning of Work Study contained a number of significant drawbacks. First, the study was mostly descriptive providing insufficient explanation as to why countries have different work centrality patterns. Second, the study consisted only of information pertaining to personal characteristics (age, sex, education, present job occupation etc.) with an explicit ignorance of both national culture and social institutional factors. Third, the study is based only on eight countries, giving limited insights into the meaning of work patterns in most other countries.

Through the micro/OB perspective, researchers have been primarily concerned with concepts related to work centrality, such as work involvement and commitment. Hence for example, OB studies have shown that work involvement is influential in determining critical work behavior and outcomes (i.e., motivation, effort, and ultimately performance, absenteeism, and turnover), job attitudes (i.e., job satisfaction and organizational commitment - even though reciprocal causation can occur) and side effects (i.e., work-family conflict, stress, health complaints, and anxiety) (Brown, 1996). In fact, research on work involvement has been linked to almost all other organizational behavior concepts (see Table 1 for a list of concepts linked to work involvement and citations).

The extant OB research on related work centrality concepts has offered some understanding of what types of variables that influence the extent to which individuals identify with their work and consider work as central to their life.

However, OB studies also present a number of serious limitations. Firstly, most OB models argue that the affective reaction to work (i.e., work centrality) is explained mostly by individual factors, thereby ignoring the cultural and contextual effects (Erez, 1990). Secondly, most studies have ignored the globalization of business and have emphasized US-domestic focused studies although the picture has been improving in recent years, yielding understanding generalizable only to U.S. organizations. Thirdly, OB studies that have taken a cross-national stance have suffered from a number of significant drawbacks. In general, most of the cross-national OB studies have compared two or three countries, presenting very limited insights in understanding OB variables across a larger number of countries. Also, others have failed to explain variance in the research findings across cultures because of the lack of a theoretical framework (Adler, 1986; Amir & Sharon, 1988). Finally, some studies have reported only descriptive findings without any attempt to specify a priori cross-cultural explanations for the results.

TABLE 1

Organizational Behavior Concepts Linked to Work Involvement

Antecedents
▪ Protestant work ethic (Brief & Aldag, 1977) ▪ Locus of control (Deci & Ryan, 1985) ▪ Intrinsic motivation (White, 1959) ▪ Self-esteem (Brown, 1996) ▪ The needs that the job satisfy (Lawler, 1982) ▪ The values people hold (Locke, 1976) ▪ Organizational characteristics (Bateman & Strasser, 1984) ▪ Task characteristics (Hackman & Oldham, 1975)
Correlates
▪ Age, tenure, education, sex, salary, marital status (in all studies)
Consequences
▪ Organizational commitment and job satisfaction (Staw, Bell, & Clausen, 1986). ▪ Job attitudes and job satisfaction (Locke, 1976) ▪ Committment to organizations (Mathieu and Zajac, 1990). ▪ Work behaviors and outcomes: absenteeism and turnover (Mowday, Porter, & Steers, 1982) ▪ Work-family conflict, anxiety (Higgins, Duxbury & Irving, 1992; Wiener, Vardi, & Muczyk, 1981)

Integration of the Work Centrality Literature

An integrative look at the meaning of work literature reveals some serious shortcomings. First, OB scholars have placed disproportionate emphasis on individual differences or the micro aspect of working centrality, which clearly ignores the context in which the work is taking place. Such OB studies have been done mostly in the US. Second, cross-cultural research on work centrality has been mostly descriptive without any significant attempt to explain country differences. Third, the effects of social institutions have been generally ignored by researchers although a number of scholars have stressed the importance of social institutions (e.g., DiMaggio & Powell [1983]; Meyer [1977; 1980]; Meyer & Rowan, [1977]) in "grasping the enduring connections between the polity, the economy, and the society" (DiMaggio & Powell, [1991: 2]).

How can these shortcomings be addressed? Given that social institutions have been completely neglected by researchers, I argue that they can fill the void and help integrate both individual differences with more macro factors to understand work centrality. Using structural effects models (described more in detail later), I assessed the impact of social institutions and national cultural factors on work centrality patterns, controlling for individual factors typical of OB studies.

Central Variables

In this section, I present a more detailed description of the variables central to this dissertation. It should be noted that the present study was

concerned with the psychological meaning of work as opposed to the meaning attached to one's present job.

Work Centrality. Work centrality is defined similarly to the Meaning of Working International Research Team (1987) as "a general belief about the value of working in one's life." It represents the general importance of work in a person's life compared to other activities such as leisure, spending time with friends or family and so on. Several studies have shown that the meaning of work differ among countries (Hofstede, 1984; The Meaning of Working International Research Team, 1987; Trompenaars, 1994). Hence for example, these studies have shown that countries like Japan and the US have relatively high work centrality whereas other countries such as Spain and Italy have relatively low work centrality (Hofstede, 1984; The Meaning of Working International Research Team, 1987).

Work centrality manifests itself through how much people are involved/committed to work. Commitment to work refers to one's involvement with working. Involvement with work is a normative belief about the value of work in one's life (Kanungo, 1982). As such, values are intrinsic enduring perspectives of what is fundamentally right or wrong (Rokeach, 1973). Hence, involvement with work affects all spheres of life in that a person who is committed to work will spend less time on activities that are not work related. Commitment to work, in this sense, is different from the concept of commitment to one's present job (Mathieu and Zajac, 1990), because it is free of short run experiences and apply more to working in general rather than a specific job.

Work Outcomes. A study of the meaning of working cannot be complete without an investigation of why people work. In that context, another major variable of interest in the present study is work functions, based on proposed taxonomies of working outcomes (i.e., Hulin and Triandis, 1981; Kaplan & Tausky, 1974; Tausky & Piedmont, 1967; Vroom, 1964). Work functions are outcomes that people hope to achieve from work. In the context of the present study, two work outcomes were identified. The first one termed economic necessity considers work as providing the basic means of survival (i.e., work providing pay, promotions, and being a necessity. The second work outcome termed expressive outcomes pertains to work as providing an expressive outlet such as meeting people, and work being useful to society. The latter categorizations are consistent with those used in The Meaning of Working International Research Team (1987) and other cross-national studies (Haire, Ghiselli, & Porter, 1966; Kraut & Ronen, 1975; Sirota & Greenwood, 1971).

The two work outcomes used in this study have also received widespread use in the voluminous work goals literature that covers job satisfaction, work values, and work needs. Mostly, these studies have consisted of employees being presented with similar work outcomes to be rated in terms of their importance (Herzberg, Mausner, Peterson, & Capwell, 1957; Quinn, 1971, Quinn & Cobb, 1971).

Findings and Contributions

Results of the dissertation provided support for four of the five major hypotheses linking social institutions to work centrality. In contrast, results

rejected all national culture hypotheses. Findings for work outcomes were similar in that the results supported the assertion that social institutions affect work outcomes. However, results for work outcomes rejected all national culture hypotheses.

Results of the study are encouraging with respect to finding relationships between social institutions (and national culture) and an individual work-related attitude. Although social institutions have often been ignored in comparative management research in favor of a focus on national culture, results show that social institutions explain an impressive amount of variance in work centrality above and beyond individual factors. Such results should be carefully considered in the light of future cross-national studies. Instead of relying primarily on national culture frameworks, such as Hofstede's (1984), researchers should also consider potential effects of social institutions.

An additional contribution of the dissertation is a demonstration of the use of Hierarchical Linear Modeling (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992) as a technique to investigate cross-level relationships of social institutions and national culture with individual-level outcomes. This endeavor is very timely given that multi-level modeling is becoming more popular, as evidenced by the whole issue of the Academy of Management Review (April 1999) devoted to multi-level theory building. It is hoped that this study will encourage the use of HLM as a statistical technique to address some of the difficulties inherent in cross-level research with social institutions (see Klein, Tosi, & Canella, Jr., [1999] for a general description of such difficulties).

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES

In this chapter, I discuss the various components of social institutions and national culture and develop testable hypotheses. First, I discuss the institutional hypotheses because they constitute the value-added to the study of the meaning of working. Second, I discuss the national culture hypotheses.

Social Institutions

In this section, I 1) define social institutions, 2) discuss how social institutions can affect individuals, 3) discuss specific social institutional components that affect the meaning of working for people in different countries, and 4) finally, develop some testable hypotheses that link the specific institutional components to the meaning of working variables.

What are Social Institutions?

The emergence and proliferation of social institutions can be understood by considering the evolution of the human species (Turner, 1997). With the emergence of the human ancestral line between five to eight million years ago to the Homo sapiens or modern humans found around 100,000 years ago, gathering and hunting remained the basis of survival. However, as humans began to settle down and cultivate their food in simple horticulture, the population began to grow. This population growth could no longer be handled with the simple family, band or kindred structures. Hence, with this change, more complex social structures and systems of cultural controls were needed to survive. Hence, social institutions

started developing, becoming more complex, and replacing older ones as a response to survival problems (Turner, 1995).

Social institutions are defined as "a complex of positions, roles, norms, and values lodged in particular types of social structures and organizing relatively stable patterns of human resources with respect to fundamental problems in life-sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining viable societal structures within a given environment" (Turner, 1997: 6). This definition also highlights the stability of institutions because it shows that even if institutions cannot handle new environments (e.g., stability and strong resistance to change the US educational system even if it may not be adequate to face the new demands of the global environment), they are still defended and preserved.

Although theorists have used institutions and social institutions to explain a variety of phenomena, no systematic research has been done to understand how social institutions affect the meaning of working pattern in different countries (see Table 2 for a list of areas where institutions have been used). This is surprising considering, for example, how often we encounter the concept of Protestant ethic. The latter simply refers to Protestant religious (i.e., a social institution) beliefs that makes hard work the norm, resulting in higher work centrality. Or Weber's (1958) assertion that under the capitalist regime (i.e., yet another social institution), the rationalist order had become an iron cage imprisoning humanity (and also influencing the meaning of working).

TABLE 2

Use Of Institutions/Social Institutions In Other Fields

▪ Organizational analysis Old institutionalism - (Selznick ,1949; 1957) New institutionalism - (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Meyer and Rowan, 1977)
▪ Macrosociology, social history, and cultural studies - (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991).
▪ Economics - (Coase ,1937; 1960; Williamson ,1975; 1985)
▪ Politics - (Shepsle, 1986)
▪ International relations - (Keohane, 1984, 1988; Young, 1986).

Given the aim of the dissertation to assess the impact of social institutions on work centrality and work outcomes, two critical issues needed to be addressed. First, it was necessary to understand how social institutions become collective structures, i.e., how they can collectively affect individual behaviors. Second, it was also essential to comprehend how social institutions affect behaviors.

How do social institutions become collective structures?

The recent articles in the Academy of Management Review (April, 1999) special issue on cross-level issues provide a good understanding of the process. Specifically, Morgeson & Hofmann (1999) argue that there is little doubt that collective structures do exist and affect individuals. To understand the collective structure, one must start with the individual behavioral act (Frese & Zapf, 1994; Parsons, 1951). However, individual behaviors do not occur in a vacuum. Individuals are influenced by their surroundings and their actions are limited by the situational and contextual factors (James & Jones, 1976).

In general, within any society, individuals are likely to "meet" or "encounter" each other (Allport, 1967), resulting in social interaction. This interaction can result in further social stimuli to other individuals (Allport, 1967) resulting in further interactions. These series of interactions or "double interact" (Weick, 1979) form the basic blocks of collective structures.

Individuals must depend on each other to survive. This mutual dependence or interdependence among individuals results in jointly produced behavior patterns that transcend the individuals that form the collective (Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999). As such frequent interactions occur with a larger number of individuals, a structure of collective actions emerges.

How do Institutions Affect Individual Behaviors?

Institutions present a freedom/constraint duality (Fararo and Skvoretz, 1986). They prescribe behavior within some acceptable limits. They are "frameworks of programs or rules establishing identities and activity scripts for such identities" (Jepperson, 1991: 146). Institutions affect individual behaviors by providing "programmed actions" (Berger and Luckmann, 1967: 75) or "common responses to situations" (Mead, 1972: 263) that provide individuals with appropriate behaviors when facing social situations. Institutions produce expectational bonds or "reciprocal expectations of predictability" (Field, 1979: 59) that eventually become taken for granted. In addition, institutions have structures that embrace values or standards of good/bad, appropriate/inappropriate, worthy/unworthy against which individuals' roles (i.e., mother, father, doctor, lawyer etc.) are evaluated. This is so because institutional structures are

designed to reflect widely held values guiding a population (Parsons, 1990; 1951).

Institutions can also affect people even if these institutions are not fully comprehensible. The latter is because people typically have functional or historical explanations of why some institutions are necessary. This means that institutions become standardized activity sequences because they have taken-for- granted rationales. Individuals will defend their actions and institutions because these institutions have been in existence for a long time and have been transmitted from generation to generation.

In sum, institutions affect individuals primarily by providing appropriate courses of action, and then reinforcing these actions through the creation of an expectational bond that is supported. Only if the expectational bond is broken will the impact of institutions on individuals weaken. However, as already stated, social institutions are highly resistant to change, not easily malleable, and are passed on from generation to generation.

Smits, Ultee, & Lammers' (1997) provide a good example to illustrate the view of social institutions used in the present study. They examined the effects of social institutions (level of economic development, degree of political democracy, and the technological background) on the level of educational homogamy between marriage partners (more homogamy meaning marriage between partners with similar educational backgrounds; clearly an individual behavior). They argued that, because highly industrialized societies place more value on achievement rather than on family background (ascription), people are more likely

to choose partners with similar educational levels. Hence, the continuous actions and reactions of individuals reinforce the collective aspect of social institutions, which have a major impact on individual behaviors.

The above discussion implies that social institutions can affect societal members both through embodied common values and norms and also through the networks of "social relationships in which processes of social interaction become organized and through which social positions of individuals and subgroups become differentiated" (Blau, 1974: 76). Although the above analytical distinction has been largely ignored by social research, both Blau (1974) and Kroeber & Parsons (1958) have demonstrated the importance of such a distinction.

Social values embodied in social institutions govern the directions that societal members deem are worth striving for. These norms are shared and reflect internal orientations. Empirically, the most realistic way to infer what values members of a society hold is to determine first, what values they hold individually, and second, which of these values are shared. Hence, one could administer the Meaning of Work Survey to a representative sample of inhabitants of a country and deduct whether members of that society share hard work as a value. Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that such a study finds that the prevalence of hard work as a value is associated with a general dissatisfaction with life. Consequently, two conclusions can then be drawn from these hypothetical findings: 1) first, if the members of a country share hard work as a

value, people will be dissatisfied with life, and 2) second, if an individual holds hard work as a value, he/she will tend to be dissatisfied in life.

The above example demonstrates two effects. The former one shows that shared values external to the individual are responsible for the dissatisfaction in life and the latter shows that internal psychological processes are responsible for these effects. This fundamental distinction is the very thesis of the present dissertation. The individual's orientation will undoubtedly affect his or her behavior. However, of interest is whether the prevalence of social values in a country affects individuals' behavior independent of the influences exerted by the internalized orientations (i.e., structural effects). Also, it is possible that the individual differences are stronger in explaining the effects rather than the shared values. Going back to the above example, it is possible that irrespective of whether one lives in a culture where hard work is shared as a value or not, those with hard work as their own value are more dissatisfied with life. Such a case would imply the absence of structural effects and the predominance of individual differences effects.

How can one show the existence of structural effects? The "structural effects of a social value can be isolated by showing that the association between its prevalence...and certain patterns of conduct is independent of whether an individual holds this value or not" (Blau, 1974: 79). To return to my previous example, if I find that, regardless of whether an individual holds hard work as a value or not, he/she is more dissatisfied with life if he/she lives in a country where hard work values prevail, there is evidence that this social value is exerting

external social constraints on the tendency to be dissatisfied with life - structural effects that are independent of the internalized value orientations.

Link Between Social Institutions and Meaning Of Work

In the next section, I discuss five major social institutions that affect the meaning of work for individuals: 1) economic systems and government ideologies, 2) labor relations, 3) industrialization, 4) social inequality and, 5) education. In the process, I develop hypotheses that link social institutions to the meaning of work.

I classify each social institution in terms whether the social institution has primarily a regulative, normative, or cognitive effects on individuals (Scott, 1995). A regulative social institution constrains and regularizes behavior through its capacity to establish rules, to inspect and review conformity, and to manipulate consequences to reinforce behavior. A normative social institution influences individual behavior primarily through its prescriptive, evaluative and obligatory dimensions of social life. Finally, cognitive social institutions take effect through taken-for-granted aspects of society.

By categorizing social institutions in terms of the regulative, normative, and cognitive aspects, we clarify the mechanism by which these social institutions affect people. Regulative social institutions, through rules and regulations, exert coercive pressures that affect people's work centrality. As such, people are forced to be more or less involved in work because they have to abide by the regulations. Normative social institutions affect people's work centrality because they create the boundaries for socially acceptable actions. With normative social

institutions, people feel more or less inclined to be involved with work by mimicking other people to be accepted. Finally, the cognitive social institutions refer to those institutions that are most entrenched in society and are taken-for-granted. Individuals develop particular levels of work centrality by responding to well understood social institutions.

Economic Systems

The economy is one of the major institutions within all industrial societies. It is a "interrelated network or system of beliefs (concerning work, property, constructs, and wealth), activities (extraction, production, and distribution), organizations (business firms, labor unions, consumer associations, regulatory agencies), and relationships (ownership, management, employment, sales) that provide the goods and services consumed by the members of a society" (Olsen, 1991). Economic systems are usually reflected in their governments' or states' influences and the latter's relationship with firms or corporations. Two aspects of the economic system are likely to affect work centrality. The first reflects governmental effects on the relationship of the workers with organizations. The second pertains to the pattern of labor relations.

The State/Government. The state or government is considered as a distinctive type of institution. Of most institutions, it is the one that has special powers and prerogatives. It has the "ability to rely on legitimate coercion" (Streeck and Schmitter, 1985a: 20) to exercise authority both on organizations and individuals.

As such, the state is regulative in nature. Consistent with Scott (1995), economic systems are maintained by clear rules and regulations on the actions of individuals. As such, the economic system exerts coercive pressures on individuals as they regulate the forces of production (Streeck & Schmitter, 1985a). The latter view is also consistent with research in economics that views the state fulfilling the necessary function of the neutral third party enforcement machinery (North, 1990).

Two ends of the continuum of the economic systems have relevance for the present study: 1) capitalism and 2) socialism. Capitalism can be traced to Adam Smith's (1937) classic An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations where he criticized the prevailing mercantilistic doctrines and outlined a new economic system that could maximize the productive capacity of society while at the same time serving the economic needs of the entire population in an efficient and equitable manner. Ideally, capitalism is centered on the perfectly competitive market where all economic enterprises are privately owned. All economic decisions concerning production, labor, prices, and sales are made by private individuals and the driving force of the economy is profit making. Consequently, all economic transactions in an ideal capitalistic economy take place within unregulated free markets where goods and services are bought and sold according to the economic laws of demand and supply (Rossides, 1990).

The socialist economic system originated in Marx's (1936) quest to understand why on one hand, the capitalist state was creating more wealth than ever before, and on the other hand, it seemed that most workers were living in

extreme poverty, paid low wages, were working in atrocious working conditions. His answer was framed in the thesis that because the dominant mode of economic production is the primary source of wealth in a society, whoever owns or controls it will be able to exercise extensive power throughout all sectors of the economy. He therefore argued that the major means of economic productions should be publicly owned rather than privately owned, i.e., a socialist economic state.

A major and obvious difference that has implications for the meaning of working for individuals is the role of the state. Although the forms of both capitalist and socialist economic systems vary significantly, there is a strong correspondence between socialism and the scope and power of the state on the other (Carroll, Goodstein, & Gyenes, 1988). Socialist states are more likely to be able to resist private pressures, to change private behavior, and even to change a nation's structure (Krasner, 1978). However, capitalism, with limited government intervention, often results in corporations that, facing the insecurities and risks of a market economy, are struggling to seek ways to reduce or control market competition (Turner, 1997). This typically results in large corporations that have significant influences on governments. These influences can range from contribution to political campaigns to lobbying for their causes.

Economic systems exert coercive pressures on individuals in what concerns the meaning of work. Coercive pressures result from the pressures from societal expectations and other forms of formal and informal pressures

(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). These pressures can be felt as force, as persuasion, or as invitations to join in the collusion.

Capitalism affects workers through the invisible marketplace and the powerful corporations that emerge. Workers are extremely vulnerable to fluctuations in the economy, changes in the labor marketplace, and arbitrary decisions by employers (Olsen, 1991). In addition, Berg (1979) in his classic discussion of the "web of rules" shaping the meaning of working, argued how in capitalist economies, corporations and managers have considerable political power to shape and structure the structure and functioning of the economy. In addition, he mentions how capitalism usually results in 1) the concentration of economic power, and 2) conglomeration, mergers, and acquisitions.

Socialism, in its pure form as communism, and in its more mild adaptations in countries like France, Germany, Sweden etc. is based on public property, public control of investment, and comprehensive public planning (Rossides, 1990). Socialist societies hope to achieve the values of capitalism by removing what they believe to be the chief obstacle to those values, private property. In addition, there is an emphasis on production for use rather than profits. In some socialist states, like Sweden, there is a very large welfare state and taxation that is used to reduce inequalities. Hence, under socialism, the government is more likely to have coercive power than private organizations, but also, workers needs' are also taken into consideration.

The regulative nature of economic system has potential effects on work centrality. In more socialist states, regulation and organization of production by

the state can discourage any form of individual initiative. The state has a key role in economic redistribution protecting and providing for employees (Rossides, 1990), also reducing the need for individuals to be involved with work to survive. In contrast, in more capitalist societies, individuals are faced with two possibilities that have similar consequences. First, individuals can take advantage of the opportunities offered by the market economy by being involved with work. Second, individuals are extremely vulnerable to powerful corporations and other fluctuations in the economy (Olsen, 1991) and have to be involved with their work to survive. Consequently, the capitalist state creates coercive pressures that seem likely to incite high worker centrality. Hence, I propose the following:

H1: Individuals in more capitalistic societies have higher work centrality.

Labor Relations. A second aspect of the economic system is the labor relation between management and employees. Berg (1979) in his classic discussion of the "web of rules" discusses the very pervasive effects of labor unions in shaping work and the meaning of work. As such, labor unions are typically formal organization of workers in an entity that fulfill various functions. Historically, labor unions were created under public charters guaranteeing a number of interests of their members. In this context, unions-their structures, their members, their members' orientation are easily identified with democratic impulses, egalitarian concept of society, and the occupational and hierarchical characters of employers and organizations.

In Scott's (1995) institutional categorization, labor unions represent a normative social institution. As such, prevalence of labor unions is associated

with certain values and norms regarding the nature of work. These values and norms are the result of progressive evolution of the cooperation between employees and certain ideological figures to shift the power from the state to the employees. In turn, these norms and values influence work centrality.

Recent trends in the US and across the world indicate bleakness for trade unions. Hence changes in global competition, demographic shifts in the labor force, technological changes, and the growth of white-collar employment in the services have all contributed to near global union decline (Bennett, 1991; Chang & Sorrentino, 1991; Faber, 1990; Hoerr, 1991; Visser, 1991). However, it is unlikely that labor unions will become extinct in the future. In some countries, labor unions are part and parcel of the work fabric (e.g., Germany, Japan) (Berg, 1979) and still have major influence on the society. Although membership rates have fallen steadily since the mid-1950s, from a high of 33% of all wage and salary workers to a low of 16% in the U.S. (Chang & Sorrentino, 1991), recent strikes at United Parcel Services and Boeing indicate that labor unions can still be powerful).

Berg (1979) in his classic discussion of the "web of rules" notes the pervasive effects of labor unions in shaping work and the meaning of work. He argues that the following agenda are high on the list of most labor unions throughout the world: 1) public policies targeted on low levels of unemployment, 2) election of political leaders favorably disposed to organized labor ends and to the various component of collective bargaining, 3) passage of laws that raise expenditures for health, occupational safety, education, and other welfare

programs. Generally, labor unions aim to serve the interests of their members through higher wages, better working conditions, reduction in workloads, etc.

Labor unions strive to provide benefits so that their members are not overworked and can engage in non-work activities (e.g., providing time off to take care of infants etc.). Labor unions are also seen as the force that regulates employers' constant exploitation of workers. Because of the typical divergent goals of management and trade unions, workers may actually be faced with normative pressures that being involved with work is not acceptable. Hence, the presence of strong and influential unions is associated with lower work centrality as these unions oppose involvement with work (regarded as exploitation). Also, fighting for such causes create normative pressures that workers follow. For instance, in France, development of unions has resulted in coercive and normative pressures that make strikes normal and accepted even if it is evidently disruptive to the economy (Cullen, 1999).

The strength and influence of labor unions depends, to a great extent, on their ability to maintain and increase their membership size (Sanyal, 1989). Larger membership size ensures that the union's views and demands are more likely to be considered. In addition, larger membership means more possibility of early socialization and exposure to unions, which can then enhance union commitment and participation (Fullagar et. al, 1995). Consequently, countries that have proportionally more trade union members have stronger trade unions. Hence, based on the above arguments, I offer the following hypothesis:

> *H2: Individuals in countries that have strong labor unions have lower work centrality.*

Industrialization

Industrialization has had a very critical impact on the organization of societies. Although a precise date cannot be pinpointed, the application of the steam engine to the gathering and producing processes initiated the Industrial Revolution in Europe (Turner, 1997). The latter eliminated excessive reliance on not only animal power, but also on human and wind power. Steam allowed the building and use of new machines that were very efficient in terms of resource extraction. This new ability to gather and transform resources coupled with open markets allowed rapid development in the production of goods, commodities, and knowledge. Consequently, industrialization enabled large factories with large number of employees around networks of machines, dramatically influencing all aspects of society.

Level of industrialization also represents a regulative social institution (Scott, 1995). As such, various levels of industrialization place different coercive pressures on individuals. For the effective functioning of society, various levels of industrialization put in place different rules and regulations that constrain individual behaviors.

How does the level of industrialization affect work centrality? We argue that the level of industrialization has regulative effects that are linked to work centrality. Blau and Duncan (1967) posit, that with industrialization, there is a value change toward universalism. With universalism, selection for occupational positions is based more on achievement than ascription (social background or family). As the basis for occupational roles shifts from ascriptive to universalistic

achievements criteria, there is the need to be more involved with work to 'achieve' and to increase social status. Given an increasing importance of work to social status, it follows that as industrialization increases, workers have higher work centrality. Hence, I hypothesize the following:

H3: Individuals in more industrialized societies have higher work centrality.

Social Inequality

Social stratification refers to the process by which "social benefits are unequally distributed and those patterns of organized inequality are perpetuated through time" (Olsen, 1991: 375). In terms of Scott's (1995) categorization, social inequality can be viewed as a cognitive social institution. In other words, as will be shown below, social inequality creates patterns of behavior that individuals take for granted. Although social inequality has been part of humankind for centuries, individuals seldom have the power to question its existence. Lewis (1978) argues that the various socialization agents (schools, parents) teach children from all class levels a culture of inequality that justifies and supports social stratification. Social inequality then produces behaviors that are taken for granted.

Social stratification can be based on four major components: power, privilege, prestige, and income. However, it is the unequal distribution of the ability of individuals and organizations to exercise power in social life that underlies most social inequality (Weber, 1958; Lenski, 1966) and is the root of most stratification. Hence, the ability of a select few to control and utilize valuable resources forms the primary power base. In addition, as technology has became

available in societies, only a few have been able to exploit these technologies, resulting in some segments of the population inevitably gaining control of a disproportionate share of resources, thereby making them more powerful than other members of society.

What are the consequences of social inequality on society? Conflict social theorists argue that social inequality creates even more inequality because only a few have control over valuable resources and they use that power to gain even more control on resources (Dahrendorh, 1959; Marx, 1956). Also, the few ensure that disadvantaged members of society are thoroughly controlled, exploited, and socialized so that they cannot create any conflict. Consequently, the few that have control force workers to sacrifice their needs and interests and surrender their will, resulting in individuals that are alienated from their work (Kanungo, 1983; Marx, 1936).

Social inequality affects work centrality through the work opportunities provided to workers. In general, a high level of inequality in society suggests that only a few high positioned individuals have the opportunity to gain certain work-related advantages (Kohn, Slomczynski, Janicka, & Khmelko, 1997). These work-related advantages typically include the greater opportunity to be self-directed in one's work, to work at jobs that are substantively complex, and to have jobs that are not under close supervision and routinized. This occupational self-direction leads to a high valuation of self-direction, greater intellectual flexibility, and even a more self-oriented to society (Kohn, 1969; Kohn & Slomczynski, 1990). In turn, these consequences of occupational self-direction

can result in more attachment and involvement in one's work, therefore higher work centrality. In contrast, since the majority of individuals in societies with high inequality are not afforded these work-related advantages, the result is workers being alienated from their organization and their work. Work alienation inevitably results in lower work centrality. Consequently, based on the above arguments, I hypothesize the following:

> *H4: Individuals in societies with more social inequality have lower work centrality.*

Education

In most modern societies, education is a powerful social institution for preserving and perpetuating the cultural heritage, as well as much of the social structure (Olsen, 1991). In addition, it is also an important agent of socialization, which teaches individuals how to function as members of society. Generally, education serves the functions of 1) transmitting the culture, 2) generating knowledge and updating society, 3) assuring personal development (Parsons, 1959).

Education is also a cognitive social institution. In other words, the educational system usually creates routines and patterns of behavior which individuals take for granted. As such, "individuals operate within particular social arenas, such as educational...., which carry with them many codified cultural rules and social routines" (Scott, 1995: 51). The educational systems also "define the ends and shape the means by which interests are determined and pursued" (Scott, 1987: 508), hence making it cognitive.

Comparative studies on education have not produced any definitive list of dimensions that can be used to compare educational systems across the world (Halls, 1990). Furthermore, those studies that have compared educational systems reveal a number of serious shortcomings as identified by Bray and Thomas (1995): 1) the dimensions used are so different from study to study so that comparison is not possible, 2) studies of different regions of the world have focussed on different levels (i.e., primary, secondary, tertiary, rural etc.), again making comparison impossible, and 3) methodologies have not been rigorous, and in some cases, purely descriptive, i.e., researchers have not benefited from the advances in statistics and psychology to analyze their findings.

Countries across the world generally use education to transmit the culture from generation to generation. However, the education is oriented towards the humanities and sciences rather than religious beliefs and values. Most countries also have educational systems that are heavily bureaucratized and professionalized (Olsen, 1991). Hence, most countries require teachers that have adequate educational qualifications to teach.

One major difference among countries the educational systems of countries is the accessibility to education. In that respect, although even the poorest nations maintain primary school systems and receive support from other countries (World Bank, 1987), accessibility to higher education (secondary and tertiary) varies greatly from country to country.

We argue that this accessibility to higher education can potentially affect work centrality. Education is generally seen as "cultural capital" that individuals

can use to further societal progress (Ramirez & Boli, 1987). In addition, education can contribute to other forms of progress such as literacy, environmental awareness, and even self-actualization. Given that individuals usually want the opportunities afforded by education to make social progress and the role of education in occupational placement (Jencks et. al, 1979; Treiman & Yip, 1989), individuals that have access to educational systems that are well-developed are more likely to be involved with work and develop high work centrality. Such phenomenon may not operate in countries where the educational system is less accessible.

Therefore, I advance:

H5: Individuals in countries with greater accessibility to education have higher work centrality.

Regulative, Normative, and Cognitive

My categorization of social institutions as having regulative, normative, and cognitive effects allows us to frame the social institutions in a theoretical framework and also to clarify the mechanisms by which these effects take place. As such, if we understand the nature of the effects and how they occur, we can also appreciate which of these effects are more likely to affect individuals.

Regulative social institutions like the economic system usually take effect through informal and formal coercive pressures (similar to DiMaggio & Powell's [1983] typology). For example, in socialist economies, the state has the power to assign jobs to individuals (Zhou, Tuma, & Moen, 1997). Normative effects occur through norms and values. That is, individuals behave in certain ways because

they are socially obliged to do so (Parsons, 1951). Finally, cognitive social institutions take effect through taken-for-granted aspects of society (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). In other words, individuals have dealt with the social institution for so long that they 'know' the appropriate way to behave without consciously thinking about it.

Considering the effects of regulative, normative, and cognitive social institutions, it seems plausible that national-level cognitive social institutions have more effects on individuals because these social institutions are perhaps the most internalized (Scott, 1995). When dealing with cognitive social institutions, individuals may mimic or unconsciously behave in appropriate ways because they have accepted and internalized the behavioral and attitudinal expectations that arise from these social institutions. In contrast, individuals may be more likely to resist the effects of regulative and normative social institutions because their effects are based on rules, norms, values imposed by external entities, i.e., the state and society respectively. There seems a probability that the expectations of regulative and normative social institutions may be less understood or more often misinterpreted relative to more crystallized and well-understood cognitive social institutions. Based on the above, I propose:

> *H6: Cognitive social institutions have stronger effects on individuals than regulative or normative social institutions.*

Work Outcomes: Expressive and Economic

A thorough study of work centrality cannot be complete unless we try to understand what people hope to achieve from work (i.e., work outcomes). Given

the dearth of cross-cultural studies comparisons of work outcomes (for an exception see The Meaning of Working International Research Team, [1987]), such an endeavor can also contribute to the field.

Hypotheses were developed by considering whether people see work as an economic necessity (i.e., work providing pay, promotions, necessity) or work as an expressive outcome (i.e., work providing the chance to meet people, work being useful to society). As mentioned earlier, these two work outcomes are similar to those used by The Meaning of Working International Research Team (1987).

State/Government. To understand whether individuals strive for economic or expressive work outcomes in either ends of the economic system continuum, it is first necessary to understand the impact of the economic system on the structuring of the economy. In the state socialist economy (redistributive), the state has a strong influence on the employment relationships and economic distribution (Oberschall, 1996; Parish & Michelson, 1996). In contrast, economic distribution in capitalist countries are governed by forces of the market.

This economic structuring has some links with work outcomes. In more socialist economies, there are usually deliberate 'destratification' policies to reduce income differences among social groups and occupations (for example, see Parish [1984] for the case of China). Economic rewards may also take the form of redistributive benefits such as health care, welfare programs, housing that depend on the workplace (Walder, 1992). Consequently, manifest, direct monetary rewards may be less useful as measures of economic position in

socialist economies. Consequently, workers may not be as interested in the economic aspect of work (i.e., because it has no social value), but may rather resort to pursuing the expressive outcome of work.

In contrast, in more capitalist societies, because of the emphasis on individual advancement and freedom, workers are more likely to view the economic aspect of work as the most important work outcome. Money is the ultimate criteria of success in the more capitalist countries. Given the available opportunities and the linking of material rewards to social status, workers are more likely to pursue the economic outcomes of work rather than the expressive outcomes. Hence, based on the above, we hypothesize:

> *H7: Individuals in more capitalist countries view the economic aspect of work as the more important work outcome than individuals in more socialist economies.*
>
> *H8: Individuals in more socialist countries view the expressive aspect of work as the more important work outcome than individuals in more socialist economies.*

Labor Relations. Labor relations, as mirrored in the strength of labor unions, has an undeniable influence on whether workers pursue economic or expressive work outcomes. In general, countries that have strong labor unions are more likely to have unions that can be highly influential and have relatively centralized and institutionalized collective bargaining (Wallerstein, Golden, & Lange, 1997). Also, in countries with strong labor unions and the heavily centralized bargaining, unions are less likely to compete for members and hence do not waste resources organizing the same membership (Western, 1994). In other words, in such countries, unions may be more influential and powerful in

securing wage increases for their members. In turn, members are likely to accept these wages knowing that their unions are fighting for them.

In contrast, in countries that have weak trade unions, employees are more vulnerable to corporations. Because of their lack of representation, workers may have no choice but to accept the wages being imposed on them. In addition, there are usually more possibilities for individual workers to negotiate their own wages in the absence of a more formal organized collective bargaining. Consequently in countries that have weaker labor unions, pursuing the economic aspect of work may become more critical than the expressive outcome.

Because strong labor unions are typically fighting for better wages for their members, workers may not be as concerned about the economic aspect of work and be more concerned with the expressive work outcomes. In contrast, in countries that have weaker labor unions, workers are more vulnerable and may be more concerned with the economic work outcome as they individually try to better their wages. In such cases, expressive work outcomes become less important. Therefore,

> *H9: Individuals in countries that have weak labor unions view the economic aspect of work as the more important work outcome than individuals in countries with stronger labor unions.*
>
> *H10: Individuals in countries that have strong labor unions view the expressive aspect of work as the more important work outcome than individuals in countries that have weaker labor unions.*

Industrialization. The level of industrialization affects workers' preference of work outcomes primarily thorough the value shift that occurs when countries become more industrialized. Blau & Duncan (1967) argues that there is

a value change toward universalism as countries become more industrialized. Occupational placements become based more on achievement rather than ascription. This value shift is supported by Treiman (1970) findings that the greater bureacratization of work decreases the ability of fathers to influence the occupational placements of their children.

With industrialization and the value shift from ascription to achievement, socioeconomic status becomes more dependent on money. Income becomes the measure of social mobility and success while social origin becomes less and less important. Consequently, coupled with success being measured by money and with the opportunity to move up socially, individuals in more industrialized countries are more likely to prefer economic outcomes from work. Expressive work outcomes may not be as important because of the lack of connection with success.

In contrast, in less industrialized countries, expressive work outcomes may become more important. Because occupational placement is dependent more on ascription, workers may develop a more fatalistic and accepting attitude toward work outcomes. With the lack of opportunities typical of more industrialized nations, they may realize that it is almost fruitless to toil for economic outcomes. Expressive work outcomes may become more important as a way to vent their frustration. Therefore, the following can be hypothesized:

> *H11: Individuals in more industrialized countries view the economic aspect of work as the more important work outcome than individuals in less industrialized countries.*

H12: Individuals in less industrialized countries view the expressive aspect of work as the more important work outcome than individuals in more industrialized countries.

Social Inequality. Social inequality affects workers' preference for particular work outcomes based on its consequences on workers. In general, a high level of inequality suggests that only a few individuals are offered certain work-related advantages (Kohn et, al., 1997). As mentioned earlier, these advantages may include greater opportunity to be self-directed in one's work, and to have jobs that are more complex. High levels of equality also means that there is more equality in terms of income. In other words, individuals living in socially equitable countries may have more control over their income (and over the economic work outcome).

In contrast, in societies that have high social inequality, work-related advantages are offered to only a privileged few. The result are workers being alienated from their organization and their work. Given that in socially inequitable societies, individuals have less control over their income and are more likely to be alienated from their work, it can be argued that they may pursue expressive work outcomes as an escape from their situation. In other words, workers in socially inequitable societies may rely on work to make friends to vent their frustration knowing that they cannot do much about the economic dimension. In contrast, individuals in socially equitable societies may work for economic reasons because they are given the opportunities to do so. Given the importance of money in such societies, expressive work outcomes may become more secondary.

Consequently, I hypothesize:

H13: Individuals in countries with more social equality view the economic aspect of work as the more important work outcome than individuals in countries with less social equality.

H14: Individuals in countries with more social inequality view the expressive aspect of work as the more important work outcome than individuals in countries with less social inequality.

Education. Consistent with the arguments presented with the previous social institutions, it seems likely that the opportunities presented by more accessible education result in individuals taking advantage of these opportunities. The latter is then reflected with a preference for the economic aspect of work because individuals know that they can be materially rewarded for their efforts and achievement. In contrast, individuals in countries with less accessible educational system emphasize the expressive work outcomes because the pursuit of economic work outcomes may be fruitless. Therefore, I hypothesize:

H15: Individuals in countries with accessible educational systems view the economic aspect of work as the more important work outcome than individuals in countries with less accessible educational systems.

H16: Individuals in countries with inaccessible educational systems view the expressive aspect of work as the more important work outcome than individuals in countries with more accessible educational systems.

NATIONAL CULTURE

In this section, I discuss the national culture hypotheses. I 1) define national culture and review some of the major studies done on national cultures, and 2) identify some critical national culture dimensions to develop my hypotheses.

National culture is defined as the values, beliefs and assumptions learned in early childhood and throughout life experiences that distinguish one group from another (Beck & Moore, 1985; Hofstede, 1991). This definition is consistent with Hofstede's (1984: 25) notion that culture is "the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the member of one human group from another...the interactive aggregate of common characteristics that influences a human group's response to its environment." Hence, national culture is the software of the mind (Hofstede, 1991) or the common theories of behavior or mental programs that are shared (Jaeger, 1986). In short, national culture is embedded deeply in everyday life and is relatively permanent.

Why a focus on national culture? As mentioned earlier, because national culture is a "central organizing principles of employees' understanding of work, their approach to it, and the way in which they expect to be treated" (Newman & Nollen, 1996). National culture implies that one way of acting or behaving is preferable to another. The values, norms, beliefs, and assumptions in the national culture are going to guide individuals in terms of whether hard work (i.e., lots of time spent at work at the expense of other life activities, hence high work centrality) or low work centrality is the proper way.

In this study, I use both Hofstede's (1984) four national culture dimensions (i.e., power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism-collectivism, and masculinity-femininity). Hofstede's (1984) empirical results have been replicated at the national level (Shackleton & Ali, 1990; Chow, Shields, & Chan, 1991) and

his cultural framework has been accepted as important and reasonable for describing differences among countries (Triandis, 1982).

Power Distance

According to Hofstede (1984:71), power distance is a "measure of the interpersonal power or influence between B and S as perceived by the least powerful of the two, S", B standing for boss and S for subordinate. It is the extent to which people believe that power and status are distributed unequally and accept the distribution of power as the proper way for social systems to be organized (Hofstede, 1984). In organizations, power distance influences the amount of formal hierarchy, the degree of centralization, and the amount of participation in decision-making. For example, in countries with high levels of power distance, organizations are more likely to be hierarchical, and subordinates are expected to be told what to do. In addition, there are very flagrant signs of status differences where salary gaps are high and superiors expect to have special privileges. However, in low power distance countries, there is less hierarchy in organizations and there are less status differences between superiors and subordinates.

How does power distance affect the meaning of working and work outcomes? In high power distance or ascription countries, people do not question authority. For example, in a high power distance country like India, the caste system prescribes the occupational and social classification of people. Nothing you do can move you to a higher caste. In contrast, in low power distance countries, success is emphasized through achievements. Individuals can

question authority and make changes if they deem the necessity of changes. Consequently, people in high power distance countries are more fatalistic. They are more likely to accept their position in life compared to individuals in low power distance countries.

In low power distance countries, because success is not dependent on family or elite educational background, people are more likely to be involved with work in order to be successful. In comparison, because of the fatalistic nature of high power distance countries, individuals may not be as willing or interested to work hard because work can seldom allow people to be more successful. Consequently, assuming that individuals wish to be more successful and move up the social ladder, it can be argued that individuals in low power distance countries have higher work centrality than individuals in high power distance countries.

How does power distance affect work outcomes? I argue that, because of the fatalistic nature of high power distance countries, individuals are less likely to rate the economic aspect of work as the most important work outcome. Identifying with 'equals' and investing in such relationships (expressive outcomes) are probably more important work outcomes. In addition, the salary gap typical of high power distance countries may discourage the average individuals from valuing economic work outcomes. In contrast, in low power distance countries, status is more a function of achievement rather than family background etc. Consequently, individuals in low power distance countries are more likely to rate money as the most important work outcome because 1) they know they can earn

what they deserve based on their achievements, and 2) money is also one of the major criteria of success. Based on the above, I hypothesize:

Hence, based on all of the above arguments, I advance the following:

H17: Individuals in low power distance countries have higher work centrality than individuals in high power distance or achievement countries.

H18: Individuals in low power distance countries view the economic aspect of work as the more important work outcome than individuals in high power distance countries.

H19: Individuals in high power distance countries view the expressive aspect of work as the more important work outcome than individuals in countries with low power distance.

Uncertainty Avoidance

Uncertainty avoidance reflects the level by which members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain, unknown, or unstructured situations (Hofstede, 1984). In high uncertainty avoidance societies, there are many formal rules controlling the rights and duties of employees and employers as well as the work process (Erez, 1990). In organizations, uncertainty avoidance is manifested by the clarity of plans, policies, procedures, and systems. Dependence on clear procedures, well-known strategies, and well-understood rules aids employees reduce uncertainty and cope with their discomfort with unknown situations.

According to Hofstede (1984: 125), a low uncertainty avoidance index is by "definition a greater willingness to take risks." People in low uncertainty avoidance countries (or inner-directed cultures) are typically more aggressive, more ambitious for individual advancement, have less hesitation to change employers, have a greater readiness to live by the day. In contrast, people in

high uncertainty countries have higher levels of anxiety, more worried about the future, have fear of failure, are less willing to take risks, and have a general fear of failure. In addition, people in low uncertainty avoidance countries are more likely to be optimistic about people's amount of initiative, ambition and have higher tolerance for ambiguity in their job or for deviant ideas. Given that in low uncertainty avoidance cultures, individuals are more likely to take risks, are more ambitious and have stronger achievement orientation, it can be argued that individuals in such cultures are more involved with work. In contrast, in cultures where people are generally worried and pessimistic about the future, are afraid even to change jobs, and have a general fear of failure, people may not be as enthusiastic about the necessity of being involved with work to fulfill their ambitions and achievement needs. Consequently, in such cultures, individuals have lower work centrality.

The cultural character of willingness to take risks, ambitious, and strong achievement motivation, typical of low uncertainty avoidance countries, all signal the desire for economic growth and economic well-being (Hofsetde, 1984), therefore emphasizing economic work outcomes. However, the lack of ambition, fear of failure, lack of achievement motivation, and the tendency of staying with the same employer imply that individuals in high uncertainty avoidance countries are not willing to take risks (for example, to get higher paid jobs etc.). Meeting people, having a secure job seem to be more crucial work outcomes for people.

Consequently, based on all the above, the following were hypothesized:

H20: Individuals in low uncertainty avoidance cultures have higher work centrality than individuals in high uncertainty avoidance cultures.

H21: Individuals in low uncertainty avoidance countries view the economic aspect of work as the more important work outcomes than individuals in high uncertainty avoidance countries.

H22: Individuals in high uncertainty avoidance countries view the expressive aspect of work as the more important work outcomes than individuals in low uncertainty avoidance countries.

Individualism/Collectivism

Individualism-collectivism is the extent to which identity is based on the self versus the collectivity and captures the patterns of relationship between the individual and the group (Hofstede, 1984; Trompenaar, 1993). It is probably one of the most important dimension that has been used to differentiate between cultures (Kluckholn & Strodbeck, 1961; Sondergaard, 1994; Triandis, 1989) and has received considerable attention from sociologist and social psychologists (Earley, 1989; Hofstede, 1984; Hui & Triandis, 1986; Trompenaar, 1993; Triandis et. al, 1988; Wagner & Moch, 1986).

Individualism refers to a self-orientation, an emphasis on self-sufficiency and control, the pursuit of individual goals that may or may not be in congruence with the in-group goals. Individuals can confront members of their own in-groups if necessary. Individuals are expected to look out for themselves and their immediate families. Status usually derives from individual accomplishment. In an individualistic environment, people are motivated by self-interest and achievement of personal goals. People are hesitant to contribute to collective action unless their own actions are recognized.

In contrast, in a collective culture, people rely on membership in groups- social classes, communities, religions, or families for identity and status. People's actions are concerned with what is best for the group which also protects them. There is a subordination of personal interests to the goals of the group emphasizing sharing, cooperation, and group harmony. Collectivists are an indispensable part of the group and will readily contribute to their group without concern if they are being taken advantage of or if other members of the group are not doing their part.

What is the relationship between work centrality and the individualism/collectivism dimension? I argue that because survival depends on personal initiative, and because people are motivated by self-interest and achievement, and take pride in their personal accomplishments, individuals in individualist cultures are more likely to become involved with work. Comparatively, because of the need to maintain harmony within the group, cooperation, sharing, and the desire to make the group happy, individuals in collectivist cultures may value other aspects of life more than work (i.e., family, friends), hence a lower work centrality. In a collectivist culture, pursuit of personal goals through hard work is actively discouraged and people are expected to conform more to group norms and requirements.

Based on the above logic, it seems likely that individualist cultures place more emphasis on economic work outcomes. Because money is probably the most accessible measure of success, and because individuals take pride in their personal accomplishments and are more likely to pursue their personal goals, the

economic aspect of work (income) becomes more critical that the expressive outcomes. In contrast, in collectivist cultures, belonging to and satisfying members of the work group, and making the appropriate contributions to group efforts are more crucial. Expressive work outcomes (making friends, having a job useful to society) are more crucial than the economic aspect of work. The group is more important than any economic aspect of work (income) because it defines status, identity, and protects the individual. Based on all the above, the following can be advanced:

> *H23: Individuals in individualist cultures have higher work centrality than individuals in collectivist cultures.*
>
> *H24: Individuals in individualist countries view the economic aspect of work as the more important work outcomes than individuals in collectivist countries.*
>
> *H25: Individuals in collectivist countries view the expressive aspect of work as the more important work outcomes than individuals in individualist countries.*

Masculinity/Femininity

Masculinity-femininity provides a final source of distinction among cultures. It is based primarily on the predominant socialization pattern where men are supposed to be assertive and women are supposed to be nurturing (Hofstede, 1984). Masculinity pertains to societies in which social genders roles are clearly distinct, and where men are expected to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success and achievements (Erez, 1990). Such societies are also characterized by doing and acquiring rather than thinking and observing, similar to Kluckholn and Strodbeck's (1961) "orientation toward activity" cultural dimension.

Femininity pertains to societies in which social gender roles overlap (Erez, 1990). In contrast, while masculine cultures value achievement and abhor failure, feminine cultures value affiliation and view failure as much less important. Trying to be better than others is neither socially nor materially rewarded (Hofsetede, 1984). In addition, there is more of a focus on quality of life and less emphasis on work. Organizations are also expected not to interfere with people's private lives.

How do the masculinity/femininity dimension affect work centrality and work outcomes? Because the masculine cultures favor achievements and abhor failures, people have intense pressures to value work and do the best they can. "Organizations in masculine societies...stress work centrality over family life, independence over interdependence, decision over intuition, assertiveness over consideration, results over process, equity over equality, and an adversary over a mutual style of conflict resolution and negotiation" (Erez, 1990: 573). Hence, the very nature of masculine societies is likely to reward and encourage higher work centrality. In contrast, feminine cultures are more concerned with family and other life areas rather than work, hence lower work centrality.

Masculine societies tend to be more concerned with work and material rewards rather than other aspects of life. This is reflected as economic growth being seen as more important than conservation of the environment, and rewards in the form of wealth or status of the successful achiever (Hofstede, 1984). It can be therefore argued that in masculine countries, there is a greater emphasis on the economic work outcomes, as income is a measure of achievement and success. In contrast, feminine cultures value other aspects of life such as the

family, relationships with people, and this is reflected in the expressive work outcomes. Consequently, based on the above, I hypothesized:

H26: Individuals in masculine cultures have higher work centrality than individuals in feminine cultures.

H27: Individuals in masculine countries view the economic aspect of work as the more important work outcomes than individuals in feminine countries.

H28: Individuals in feminine countries view the expressive aspect of work as the more important work outcomes than individuals in masculine countries.

CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, I discuss the various aspects pertaining to the research approach used in this dissertation. In addition, I emphasize the use of Hierarchical Linear Modeling statistical technique because of its novelty and appropriateness.

Sample and Data Sources

Individual-Level Data. Individual-level data for the present study came from World Values Survey (World Values Study Group, 1994) and were made available through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. The World Values Survey was conducted in 43 countries, which represented almost 70 percent of the world's population (World Values Study Group, 1994).

The World Values Survey was sponsored by the European Values Study Group. In cooperation with a large number of universities and other research organizations, data concerning work, the meaning and purpose of life, and other social issues were collected throughout the world.

Sample. The universe for the survey included adults 18 and over in 43 countries. Both national random and quota sampling were used. See Appendix A for a list of the countries used in this study and the sample size for each country. We studied 27 countries where we could reliably measure our dependent variables.

All surveys were conducted with face-to-face interviews. However, the quality of the sample varied from one country to another, since both available funding and research infrastructures were limited in many countries. In general, surveys in Western countries were carried out by professional survey organizations with extensive experience (most of them members of the Gallup chain). In contrast, surveys in Eastern European countries were conducted by their respective national academies of science or university- based institutes, many of which had limited experience in survey research. We suspect that poor measures found for some countries occurred because of this inexperience.

Social Institutions Data. I added to the individual-level data by collecting measures of social institutions for each country from various secondary data sources (described in more detail below). These measures of social institutions included indicators of the degree of socialism of the state/government, the pattern of labor relations, the level of industrialization, socioeconomic stratification, and access to education.

Country-level data on social institutions were uniformly assigned to all individuals within that country. That is, all individuals from the same country were assigned the same measure of that country's social institutions. The result was a data set that included individual-level data on 31,390 individuals and social institutional data on 27 countries.

National Culture Data. I also added national culture measures from Hofstede (1984). These measures included power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism/collectivism, and masculinity/femininity. Country-level

data was also uniformly assigned to individuals within that country. The result was a data set that included 22899 individuals from 20 countries.

Dependent Variables

The original researchers asked respondents to assess the importance of work and what they expected from work with three items (combination of two-points and four point scales). For example, one question was "Please say how important is work in your life?" measured by a 4 point scale (very important to not at all important). Another question required respondents to rate work on 2 point scale item. Respondents were asked "Here are some statements about why people work...which comes closest to what you think: I enjoy my work; it's the most important thing in my life." See Appendix B for complete descriptions of the measures of the dependent variables used in this study.

Two other work outcomes used in other cross-national studies (The Meaning of Working International Research Team, 1987) were used in this study. These included the respondents' assessment of work as an economic necessity and work as an expressive outcome.

To measure work as an economic necessity and work as an expressive outcome, respondents were presented a number of items indicative of what people expected from work. The respondents were then asked to indicate how important each item was to them. In other words, respondents had to indicate which work outcome was more desirable to them.

Work as an economic necessity was measured by their agreements on items such as "Work provides good pay", and "Work provides good chances for

promotions." Work as an expressive outcome was measured by items such as "Work provides pleasant people to work with" and "Work provides an opportunity to achieve something."

Independent Variables: Social Institutional Measures

All measures of social institutions were from 1990, the year of the World Values Study Group's (1994) survey, with the exception of the percentage of government expenditures, based on 1989 data.

State/Government. The degree of capitalism or socialism was operationalized by central government expenditures expressed as a percentage of the gross domestic product. We reasoned that socialist countries would have a higher percentage of central government expenditures to reflect a higher level of governmental intervention, consistent with Olsen (1991). Data on government expenditures were collected from the *United Nations Statistical yearbook* (United Nations, [1992]).

Labor Relations. Trade union density was assessed by the percentage of the workforce that was unionized. The latter is accepted as a measure of union strength (Wallerstein, Golden, & Lange, 1997). Data were collected from the *Employment Outlook* (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [1991]), Chang & Sorrentino (1991), and Visser (1991).

Level of Economic Development. We assessed the level of economic development by the general energy use (in mega tons of coal), similar to the measure used by Smits, Ulttee, and Lammers (1997). The indicator is accepted as a reflection of the level of development because more industrialized countries

consume more energy. Data were collected from the *United Nations Statistical Yearbook* (United Nations, [1992]) and the *World Bank World Development Indicators* (World Bank, [1998]).

Social Inequality. The GINI index measured the level of inequality. The GINI measures the extent to which the distribution of income among individuals or households within a country deviates from a perfectly equal distribution (World Bank, 1998). A Lorenz curve is used to plot the cumulative percentages of total income received against the cumulative percentage of the number of inhabitants, beginning with the poorest individual. The GINI index then measures the area between the Lorenz curve and the absolute line of equality, as a percentage of the maximum area under the line. As such, the GINI is accepted as a composite index of the wealth distribution in any society. High levels of the GINI index imply more social inequality. The GINI index is a common measure of inequality (see Bloom [1999] for an organizational application of the GINI index). The GINI index was collected from the *World Bank World Development Indicators* (World Bank, [1998]).

Education. Accessibility to education was measured by the educational attainment score (United Nations Development Program, 1991). It is a combined measure of adult literacy (giving an indication of the most basic educational attainment) and the means years of schooling. The educational attainment measure is computed by the formula (2/3 of adult literacy rates + 1/3 of Mean years of schooling), as used by the United Nations Development Program (1991). Educational attainment is generally accepted as providing information

about the access to and the general level of education of the country (United Nations Development Program, 1991).

National Culture

Hostede's (1984) scores on each of the national culture dimensions (i.e., power distance, uncertainty avoidance, masculinity/femininity, individualism/collectivism) were attached to their respective country. These constituted the measures of the national culture dimension.

Control Variables

The original data set allowed controlling for two types of individual determinant of work centrality and work outcomes. The first type was a more general control variable and included age. Previous research on involvement has shown that older people tend to be more involved with work (Mathieu & Zajac, 1990).

I also included a second type of control variables, necessary because of the nature of contextual analysis. The second type of control variables included parallel individual measures for the country-level independent variables. I included union membership (a parallel individual level variable to country trade union strength), number of years of education (a parallel individual control for country level educational accessibility), and gender (a parallel individual level control for country level masculinity/femininity). For example, if I can control for union membership, and can show that country level union strength affect work centrality, then I have demonstrated the existence of contextual effects. Also

previous research has shown that these variables are related to work centrality (The Meaning of Working International Research Team, 1987).

Analyses

Factor Analysis. To establish a level of discriminant validity, all dependent variables were factor analyzed using a principal components solution with Promax rotation. Results reported in Appendix C showed coefficient alpha (reliability) ranging from 0.97 to 0.63.

Cross-Level Analysis

Contextual Analysis. The research approach in the present dissertation assumed that the context of each country affects the work centrality of the individuals who belong to the country. This approach necessitated that I demonstrate that country-level variables have an effect above and beyond any individual factors that might potentially affect work centrality. Such an approach is know as contextual analysis (Iversen, 1991).

Contextual analysis has wide use in the sociology literature (Blalock, 1984, Przeworski, 1974). A good example of a contextual analysis, similar to the present dissertation's research, is illustrated by Kelley & de Graaf's (1997) study. They examined the impact of the religious context of countries on the religiousness of individuals within the country and the way religious beliefs is transmitted from generation to generation. They argued that, although parents affect their children's religious beliefs, the religious environment (peer groups, schools, employers etc.) is also a significant force that shapes people's religious beliefs. They categorized countries as either predominantly religious or

predominantly secular and hypothesized that the religious context of either categories has differential effects on individuals everything else kept constant. Hence, they argued that in a predominantly religious environment, individuals are more likely to acquire religious friends, teachers, colleagues, and marriage partners and are therefore more likely to become or remain religious. In contrast, people from secular countries, are more likely to encounter secular friends, teachers, colleagues etc. and are hence more likely to become secular themselves. Consequently, their arguments supported the predominance of environment factors (and not individual factors) as major determinants of religiousness. The dependent variable was then the individual's religious beliefs while countries were classified according to the intensity of their citizen's religious beliefs.

In addition to the main effects of the country's religious environment on people's religiousness, the authors argued that the national religious effects have differential effects on the strategies of devout and secular families. They advanced that devout parents in secular societies must work hard to control the children's environment as a protection from secular influences – hence the effects of the family's religious background is large while the effects of the religious environment is small. In contrast, they proposed that secular parents in devout societies are not as likely to protect their children from the religious influences for a number of reasons. They argued that secular parents are very unlikely to be committed atheists and that parents may see little harm in their children becoming religious – given the practical disadvantages and prejudice of

religious societies on secular individuals. Hence, it was hypothesized that effects of family backgrounds are small while the effects of the religious environment are large.

The above example clearly illustrates the contextual approach perspective. However, an illustration of the contextual approach using an organizational example can further clarify the research demeanor. Markham & McKee's (1995) study on absence climates provides a good example. In that study, they hypothesized that socially defined supervisory groups with low standards of absenteeism (i.e., where there are more acceptable absences) have more absence incidents and vice versa. They also controlled for three possible individual factors that may affect absenteeism. This study is also a clear example where the effects of the context (i.e., absence climate of supervisory groups) on individual absences are assessed, while controlling for potential individual factors that may affect the dependent variable. By so doing, the authors showed that absence climates can affect individual absences above and beyond individual determinants of absenteeism, clearly a contextual analysis.

Both illustrations provide an understanding of the research approach used in the present study. Hence, the dependent variables are work centrality and work outcomes, while independent variables include a number of individual factors (such as income, age, gender, marital status etc.) and a number of country level factors (such as education, level of industrialization, economic system etc.). To show support for institutional effects, and/or national culture effects (and hence country effects), and consistent with contextual analysis, one

must show that if individual factors are controlled, the institutional factors still affect individual work centrality.

How can Contextual Effects be Statistically Tested?

How can these effects be statistically tested? Past studies have relied on two applications of linear regression. The first application involves a regression of the dependent variable on all individual and country factors. In this case, each individual within the same country is assigned the same country factor values (i.e., data disaggregation). Hence, in the present case, a linear regression with the form

Work Centrality, Work Outcomes = β_0 + β_1*Individual Factors + β_2*Country Factors is performed.

The second linear regression application involves using the mean values of each country on the individual factors (i.e., data aggregation). Through this second application, instead of assigning the same country factors to each individual, the country mean on the individual factors is used instead. Hence, in this second situation, the regression parameters are estimated using N as number of countries instead of N being the number of respondents as in the first case.

Problems With Either Approach

Because of the complexities inherent with the cross-level research approach, neither of the above statistical methods provides adequate results. When the first linear regression application is used, individuals within each country have the same values on the country-level variables. As such, the usual

regression assumption of independence of errors is violated – which leads to potentially biased regression coefficients. In addition, the regression coefficients for the country effects are dependent on the amount of data available for each country, thereby also leading to biased coefficients (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1989). Finally, if the data are analyzed at the individual level, thereby ignoring the 'nesting' of individuals within countries, the estimates standard errors will be too small, and the risk of type 1 errors inflated (Aitkin, Anderson, & Hinde, 1981; Burstein, 1980).

However, if the second linear regression application is used, a great deal of information on within-country variation is lost. In such cases, the relationships among between country variables may appear stronger than they really are. Also, it becomes harder to incorporate more individual factors in the model (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). A second related problem with using the mean values of individual factors for each country is that possible interaction between the individual factors and country variables cannot be tested. The need to test for interactions is evident from the first example of contextual analysis described previously. Finally, by using aggregated data from the individual level, one cannot draw inferences at the individual level, without risking the ecological fallacy (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1989).

In general, aggregation and disaggregation modify the variances and convariances of data, thereby influencing their correlations and regression coefficients, and even changing the meaning and character of the data itself (Rousseau, 1985). Given these difficulties and the criticisms and complications

inherent in using traditional research strategies and statistical methods (see Rousseau, 1985) for cross-level research, a more sophisticated statistical technique is necessary. Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) is well suited for that purpose and used in this study.

A Solution: Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM)

The statistical theory for HLM has developed out of several fields of methodological research. Significant contributions come from biometric applications of mixed-models ANOVA (Strenio, Weisberg, & Bryk, 1983), and most importantly, from "developments in the statistical theory of covariance components model and Bayesian estimation for linear models" (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1989: 237).

HLM resolves the various problems inherent in the traditional statistical approach. Hence, issues such as the aggregation and dissagregation bias, misestimated precision, and the unit of analysis are all tackled by HLM. With HLM, one can readily test hypotheses about relations occurring at one level and across level, but importantly, one can assess the amount of variation at each level (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1993).

Braun, Jones, Rubin & Thayer (1983) provide a practical example of the usefulness of HLM. They were concerned with the effects of using standardized test scores for selecting minority applicants for graduate school. Many schools base their admission decisions on equations that use test scores to predict later academic success. However, most models are generated from data based on white applicants as they represent most of the applicants to graduate school.

Consequently, using such equations may not be adequate for purposes of selecting minority students.

Given such difficulties, using a separate equation for minority applicants in each school seems fairer. However, it is very hard to estimate such equations because most schools have very few minority students and hence little data to develop reliable coefficients. Because of the small size of the data, using standard regression methods is virtually impossible.

Alternatively, the data can be pooled across all schools, but this ignores the nesting of students within schools (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1993). This approach also poses difficulties because minorities are more likely to be present in some schools than others. By using a standard regression approach based on pooled data, there is a failure to recognize the selection artifacts, which leads to biased estimated prediction coefficients.

Braun et al. (1983) used HLM to resolve these difficulties. By using the available information from the entire data, they were able to efficiently use all the information to provide each school with separate equations for whites and minorities. The estimator for each school was actually "a weighted composite of the information from that school and the relations that exist in the overall sample (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1993: 5).

The above example shows how HLM was appropriate for the present study. By using HLM, I was able to use more accurately the information from each country to assess the impact of the country level variables on the

dependent variables. Also, the use of HLM avoided that countries with larger sample sizes have a disproportionate effect on the dependent variables.

Formulation of the HLM Model

The use of HLM necessitates a distinction between individual level variables and other higher levels (e.g., schools, organizations, countries etc.). Given that I was interested in assessing the impact of country institutional and national culture factors on individuals, then the formulation of the HLM consisted of two levels. At level 1 (the micro level model, Mason et al., 1983), the units are individuals and each person's outcome's is represented as a function of a set of individual characteristics. At level 2, the units are countries, where the dependent variables are hypothesized to depend on specific country factors adjusted for regression coefficients in the level 1 model.

Individual-level Model (Level 1)

Because work centrality and work outcomes are the dependent variables of interest in the present study, we can then denote the dependent variables for person i in country j as Y_{ij}. This outcome can be represented as a function of individual characteristics, X_{qij} and a model error r_{ij}.

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j} X_{1ij} + \beta_{2j} X_{2ij} + \ldots + \beta_{Qj} X_{Qij} + r_{ij}$$

where Y_{ij} is the dependent variables for individual i in country j

and the regression coefficients $\beta_{qj,\ q} = 0, \ldots, Q$ indicate how the depedent variables are distributed in country j as a function of the measured person characteristics (i.e,, age, education, gender etc.).

and β_{0j} is the average of the dependent variables level in country j

Country-level Model (Level 2)

A distinctive feature of the HLM is that country effects, represented by the micro level coefficients β, are presumed to vary across countries. Therefore, a between-country or macro-level model can be formulated where the βs are conceived as outcome variables that depends on a set of country-level variables. Formally, the macro level model is formulated as

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_0 + \gamma_1 W_{1j} + \gamma_2 W_{2j} + \ldots\ldots + \gamma_S W_{Sj} + u_{qj}$$

where β_{0j} is the mean of the dependent variables in country $_j$

and $\gamma_1 \ldots\ldots \gamma_S$ are the coefficients that capture the effects of country variables W_{sj} ($s = 1,\ldots s$) (i.e., type of economic system, education, level of industrialization, national culture etc.) on the within-country levels represented by β_{0j}.

and u_{qj} are the unique effects associated with country $_j$.

HLM output includes coefficients for both micro and macro levels where significant effects can be assessed. HLM also produces variance to understand the incremental variance explained by additional variables. Hence, importance of country-level or individual-level factors on work centrality can also be investigated.

CHAPTER FOUR

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

This chapter shows the descriptive statistics for all measures, factor analysis for the dependent variables, statistics for the overall HLM models, and the results of the tests of hypotheses. Table 3 below includes all descriptive statistics for variables included in the study. These correlations and statistics are based on data counterweighted by country sample size. This equalized the contribution of each country regardless of sample size. Cronbach's reliability alpha for the dependent variables ranged from 0.63 to 0.92. Although 0.63 is considered marginal, it is often accepted in exploratory work (Nunnally, 1978). Correlation among independent variables ranged from –0.65 to 0.53.

Factor Analysis

Appendix C shows the factor analysis for work centrality and the two work outcomes. Consistent with our expectations, three factors were identified and loaded on the appropriate theoretical items. All three factors were reliably identified. In addition, the lack of cross-loadings and the high loadings of each item on their respective appropriate factors provided evidence for discriminant validity of our measures.

Three measures were then constructed using the mean of the items identified in the factor analysis.

TABLE 3

Correlations and Descriptive Statistics by Level[a]

Variable	N	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
1. Gender	31390	.50	.50															
2. Union Membership	31390	1.50	.79	.06***														
3. Education	31390	6.06	3.6	-.06***	-.25***													
4. Age	31390	41.42	16	.01**	.12***	-.26***												
5. Work Centrality	31390	1.33	.42	-.18***	-.17***	-.03***	-.03***											
6. Economic Outcomes	31390	1.24	.37	-.06***	-.07***	.04***	-.06***	-.006										
7. Expressive Outcome	31390	1.14	.24	-.03***	-.1***	.18***	-.07***	.10***	.11***									
8. Educational Attainment[b]	27	2.52	.53	.05***	.47***	.00	.18***	-.17***	-.11***	-.11***								
9. Energy Consumption[c]	27	5147	577	.04***	.36***	.06***	.16***	-.14***	-.07***	-.07***	.17***							
10. Union Density[d]	27	42.22	21	-.02***	.15***	.04***	.06***	-.14***	-.07***	-.11***	.42***	.32***						
11. Inequality[e]	27	33.79	9.2	.06***	.06***	.11***	.07***	-.06***	-.06***	-.06***	.24***	.19***	.18***					
12. Government Expenditure[f]	27	30.01	30	.03***	.18***	-.06***	.07***	.05***	-.06***	-.07***	.08***	.05***	-.12***	-.09***				
13. Power Distance	20	46.93	19	.02***	-.31***	-.12***	-.16***	-.15***	-.14***	.13***	.53***	.28***	.28***	.42***	.45***			
14. Uncertainty Avoidance	20	61.89	25	-.02***	.41***	-.19***	-.03***	.18***	.07***	-.03***	.10***	-.62***	-.21***	-.51***	-.13***	-.41***		
15. Individualism	20	60.52	21	.006	.15***	.06***	.16***	-.06***	-.03***	-.09***	-.22***	-.29***	-.29***	-.24***	.21***	.03***	.54***	
16. Masculinity	20	49.52	22	.007	.02***	-.18***	0	-.12***	-.09***	-.09***	.52***	.76***	.17	.27***	.04***	.09***	-.65***	-.55***

Notes: ** p<.01, *** p<.001

[a] Statistics are based on data counterweighted by sample size to offset the effects of different sample sizes in each country

[b] Educational attainment was measured by a composite score combining adult literacy and mean years of schooling

[c] Energy consumption was measured in megatons of coal

[d] Union density was measured by the percentage of workforce that was unionized

[e] Inequality was measured by the GINI index. An index of 100 indicates perfect inequality and 0 perfect equality

[f] Government expenditure was expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product

Hierarchical Linear Modeling Analyses

The first step in the analysis of all dependent variables was to assess the variance explained by social institutions and national cultures. In other words, I determined what percentage of the models tested was being explained by the addition of social institutions and national culture beyond individual-level control variables. The second step was to estimate the coefficients of the independents variables on work centrality and work outcomes as test of the hypotheses.

Variance Explained by Social Institutions

Consistent with the methods described by Bryk & Raudenbush (1992: 62), I first determined whether there was systematic between-country variation in the dependent variables using only models with individual level variables. These models are equivalent to ANOVA tests to determine whether the between country differences are larger than the within country differences (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992: 33). The Level 1 model revealed a within country variance for work centrality of $\sigma^2 = 84.71$ and the variance of the between country mean (typically referred to as the true country mean in HLM terminology) of $\pi_{00} = 9.95$. These estimates suggest that, the variance in work centrality between countries is $\rho = \pi_{00} / (\pi_{00} + \sigma^2)$ or 9.95 / (9.95+84.71) = 11.7%. Similar procedures were used for economic work outcomes and expressive work outcomes. Estimates suggested that the between countries variance in economic work outcomes was 13.4 % while between countries variance in expressive work outcomes was 25%.

I then constructed level 2 models and assessed the variance explained by adding the social institutional variables. I compared the π_{00} estimates across the

level 1 and level 2 models. For work centrality, the π_{00} estimate for the level 2 model was 7.83. Using the π_{00} estimate for level 1, I calculated the amount of additional variance between country explained by the addition of level 2 variables. Specifically, $(\pi_{00\ Level1} - \pi_{00\ Level2})/\ \pi_{00\ Level1}$ or (9.95-7.83)/9.95) or 21%. This means that 21% of the 11% true between-country variance in work centrality was accounted for by the social institutions. Similar procedures were also used to assess what proportion of the between country variance in economic work outcomes and expressive work outcomes was explained by social institutions. Specifically, 4% of the 13.4% between country-variance in economic work outcomes was accounted for by social institutions while 3% of the 28% between country-variance in expressive work outcomes was explained by social institutions.

Variance Explained By National Culture

I used similar procedures for the country-level models using national culture. I first ran the models with individual-level variables. The Level 1 model for work centrality revealed a within country variance of $\sigma^2 = 87.74$ and the variance of the between country mean of $\pi_{00} = 11.58$. These estimates suggest that, the variance in work centrality between countries is $\rho = \pi_{00} / (\pi_{00} + \sigma^2)$ or 13.4%. Similar procedures on economic work outcomes and expressive work outcomes revealed that the between countries variance in economic work outcomes was 4.9 % while the variance in expressive work outcomes was 10.2%.

I then constructed the level 2 models for the dependent variables and assessed the variance explained by the national culture variables. I compared the π_{00} estimates across the level 1 and level 2 models. For work centrality, the π_{00} estimate for the level 2 model was 15.79. However, the π_{00} estimate for the level 2 was larger than the π_{00} estimate for the level 1, suggesting that the addition of national culture variables does not explain any additional proportion of between country variance on work centrality above and beyond the individual factors. Similar results were obtained for economic and expressive work outcomes whereby national culture variables did not explain any additional proportion of the between country variance on economic and expressive work outcomes.

Hypotheses Testing

Hypotheses testing focused on the models that explained significant between country variance for country level variables. Consequently, only the social institutions model had significant coefficients reflecting the effects of social institutions on work centrality and work outcomes. Table 4 below reports the coefficients for the social institutions model.

In contrast, national culture variables did not explain any significant proportion of the between country variance in work centrality and work outcomes. Consequently, the national culture had no significant coefficients to show the effects of national culture on the dependent variables. All hypotheses related to national culture were rejected.

TABLE 4

Hierarchical Linear Modeling Analysis and Coefficients

	Work Centrality	Economic Outcome	Expressive Outcome
Social Institutions HLM			
Individual level variables			
Gender	-.07***	-.07***	-.01***
Age	.05**	-.12***	.00
Education	.00	-.12***	.12***
Union membership	-.06**	-.05**	-.07***
Country level variables			
Socialism	-.11***	.01	-.07***
Labor relations	-.08***	.06***	-.04***
Industrialization	.02***	.24***	.19***
Social Inequality	-.04***	.00	-.02**
Education	-.19***	-.34***	-.28***

** p<.01 *** p<.001

Control Variables

Several control variables were included in this study. In this section, I present results pertaining to the relationship between control variables and dependent variables. I discuss some of the implications of these results in the next chapter.

Gender. Gender, measured by a dummy variable (0 – male, 1 – female), was negatively associated with work centrality. In other words, men had higher work centrality than women. Results also showed that gender was negatively related to both expressive and economic work outcomes, i.e., males consistently viewed both work outcomes as more important than females.

Age. Age was positively related to work centrality. This suggested that older individuals had higher work centrality. Other results showed that age was

negatively related to economic work outcomes and had no association with expressive work outcomes.

Education. Education was not associated with work centrality, i.e, all individuals had the same level of work centrality irrespective of their educational level. However, results showed that education was negatively associated with economic work outcomes and positively associated with expressive work outcomes.

Union Membership. Union membership had a negative association with work centrality, i.e., union members had higher work centrality than non union members. In addition, union membership was also negatively associated with both expressive and economic work outcomes.

Hypotheses: Description of Results

In the following section, I restate all the hypotheses and describe the results. These results are then summarized in Table 5 below.

H1 posited that individuals in more socialist societies have lower work centrality. This hypothesis was supported. The percentage of government expenditures had a significant negative coefficient. Because all variables were standardized prior to the analysis, our results imply that a standard unit change in government expenditure lowers work centrality by 0.11 of a standard deviation.

H2 proposed that individuals in countries that have strong labor unions have lower work centrality. This hypothesis was supported given that the trade union density had a negative coefficient, suggesting that a standard unit change

in trade union density results in a decrease in work centrality by 0.08 of a standard deviation.

H3 stated that individuals in more industrialized countries have higher work centrality. This hypothesis was supported in that the energy consumption measure had a significant and positive effect on work centrality. These show that a standard unit increase in the level of industrialization is accompanied by a 0.02 increase in a standard unit of work centrality.

H4 stated that individuals in countries that have higher social inequality have lower work centrality. This hypothesis was also supported because of a significant and negative coefficient. A unit standard increase in social inequality was associated with a 0.04 decrease in a standard unit of work centrality.

H5 posited that individuals in countries that have highly accessible educational systems have higher work centrality. This hypothesis was not supported. Instead, results showed that a unit standard increase in education was accompanied by a .19 decrease in a standard unit of work centrality.

H6 stated that cognitive social institutions have stronger effects on individuals than normative or regulative social institutions. This hypothesis was only partially supported. The social institution that had the strongest effect (education), albeit opposite to our hypothesis, was indeed a cognitive social institution. However, the second cognitive social institution investigated, social inequality, had one of the weaker effects.

H7 predicated individuals in countries with higher levels of capitalism viewed economic work outcomes as more important. This hypothesis was

rejected. Results show that lower levels of capitalism or socialism is positively associated with economic work outcomes. A standard unit increase in government expenditure was accompanied by .01 increase in standard unit of economic work outcome.

H8 hypothesized that individuals in countries with higher levels of socialism viewed expressive work outcomes as more important. This hypothesis was also rejected because a standard unit increase in socialism resulted in .07 standard unit decrease in expressive work outcomes.

H9 posited individuals in countries with weak labor unions are more likely to view economic work outcomes as more important. This hypothesis was rejected. Results show that stronger trade unions had a positive relationship with economic work outcomes. A standard unit increase in trade union strength was associated with a .06 standard unit increase in economic work outcome.

H10 stated individuals in countries with strong labor unions view expressive work outcomes as more important. This hypothesis was also rejected because of a significant negative coefficient. A standard unit increase in union strength was associated with a .04 standard unit decrease in expressive work outcomes.

H11 predicated individuals in more industrialized countries view economic work outcomes as more important while H12 posited that individuals in less industrialized countries view expressive work outcomes as more important. Results show that industrialization was positively associated with both economic

work outcomes (coefficient of 0.24) and expressive work outcomes (coefficient of 0.19). Results provided support for H11 but rejected H12.

H13 stated that individuals in countries with more social equality have stronger preferences for economic work outcomes while H14 posited that individuals in countries with more social inequality have stronger preferences for expressive work outcomes. H13 was rejected in that there was no relationship between social equality and economic work outcomes. H14 was also rejected because a standard unit increase in social inequality was accompanied by a 0.02 standard unit decrease in expressive work outcomes.

Hypotheses H15 and H16 proposed relationships between education accessibility and work outcomes. H15 stated that individuals in countries with accessible education systems view the economic work outcomes as more important. H16 posited that individuals in countries with inaccessible education systems view expressive work outcomes as more important. Results support H16 (negative coefficient of 0.28 expressing the relationship between education accessibility and expressive work outcomes) and reject H15 (negative coefficient of 0.34).

Hypotheses H17-H28 predicated the relationships of national culture variables with work centrality and work outcomes. Results rejected all hypotheses because national culture variables did not explain any additional between country variance on the dependent variables above and beyond the individual level variables.

Given the large number of hypotheses, Table 5 below summarizes the hypotheses, actual results, and whether the hypotheses were supported or rejected.

TABLE 5

Hypotheses and Actual Results

	Relationship	Hypot-hesized Results	Actual Results	Support/ Reject
Social Institutions				
H1	Capitalism → Work Centrality	+	+	Support
H2	Labor relations → Work Centrality	-	-	Support
H3	Industrialization → Work Centrality	+	+	Support
H4	Social Inequality → Work Centrality	-	-	Support
H5	Education → Work Centrality	+	-	Reject
H6	Cognitive greater effects	+	+	Partial
H7	Capitalism → Economic Outcome	+	-	Reject
H8	Capitalism → Expressive Outcome	-	+	Reject
H9	Labor relations → Economic Outcome	-	+	Reject
H10	Labor Relations → Expressive Outcome	+	-	Reject
H11	Industrialization → Economic Outcome	+	+	Support
H12	Industrialization → Expressive Outcome	-	+	Reject
H13	Social inequality → Economic Outcome	-	-	Support
H14	Social inequality → Expressive Outcome	+	0	Reject
H15	Education → Economic Outcome	+	-	Reject
H16	Education → Expressive Outcome	-	-	Support
National Culture				
H17- H28	National Culture → Dependent Variables			Reject

CHAPTER FIVE

DISCUSSION, LIMITATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, I discuss the results and implications for the study. Discussions are presented in various subsections as follows: 1) control variables, 2) social institutions and work centrality, 3) social institutions and work outcomes, 4) national culture and work centrality and work outcomes, 5) implications of findings for control variables, 6) limitations, 7) managerial implications, and 8) conclusions.

Control Variables

Results for gender showed that men had higher work centrality than women. This is not surprising given that many general cultural values of society (Psathas, 1968; Trommsdorff, 1983), values of the family (Hall, 1976; Trommsdroff, 1983), feminine role perceptions (Crawford, 1978; Pharr, 1977), and the evolution of humans all reflect the belief that men should work and women should stay at home. In addition, males rated economic work outcomes as more important while females rated expressive work outcomes as more important. The latter is also consistent with gender differences whereby males are supposed to focus on material success while females are more concerned with quality of life (Erez, 1990).

Results for age showed that older individuals had higher work centrality. These results are consistent with research that older workers become more committed to their organization and to work (i.e., hence higher work centrality) for a variety of reasons (Meyer and Allen, 1984). Reasons include greater

satisfaction with their jobs, having received better position, and having cognitively justified their work. Results also show that younger individuals viewed economic work outcomes as more important while older workers viewed expressive work outcomes as more important. In general, older workers may be more financially and emotionally secure in life, hence rating expressive work outcomes as more important. In contrast, younger individual are still in the process of reaching financial security and maturity, hence they viewing economic work outcomes as most important.

Education had no relationship with work centrality. However, education was negatively associated with economic work outcomes and was positively associated with expressive work outcomes. These results are consistent with a number of studies have found a positive relationship between education and values or beliefs in most countries (Hayashi et. al., 1977). In general, educational attainment provides the opportunity for people to examine their beliefs and values more thoroughly. In addition, people are usually encouraged and reinforced in such investigations. Hence, the more people can engage in such processes, the more they can reduce discrepancies or cognitively explain their values and become more satisfied with their work. In the process, they become to value more expressive outcomes as a preference for quality of life issues rather than merely economic work outcomes.

Finally, union membership was negatively associated with all dependent variables. Consistent with my country level arguments, being a union member probably encourages more identification with union goals. Given that many

union are actively trying to better the work conditions of their members and are trying to reduce the workload, this translated into union members being less involved with work. Also, because their unions are also typically fighting to better their wages and work conditions, union members do not value either economic work outcomes or expressive work outcomes.

Social Institutions and Work Centrality

Education. By far, the social institution that had the most impact on work centrality was education. This is not surprising given the socialization effects of education and its relationship with access to particular occupations. However, the relationship was opposite to that expected, i.e., individuals in societies with the most accessible educational systems had lower work centrality.

My explanation for this surprising finding may come from changes affecting the world educational systems. Various researchers have concluded that there is a global convergence in terms of educational systems and curriculum across the world (Meyer, Ramirez & Soysal, 1992; Kamens & Benavot, 1992). In addition, most societies view education as a social capital that focuses on the socialization of its members and articulates a vision of progress where action and achievement happen (Benavot, Cha, Kamens, Meyer, & Wong, 1991). Hence, these goals of education together create a sense of efficacy in people or "feelings that one can accomplish what one sets out to do" (Paulsen, 1991: 96). Consequently, individuals who reside in countries that have highly accessible educational systems might become more likely to developed self-direction (i.e., shown by Kohn, [1969] at the domestic level) and the belief

that they can achieve their life's goals. This efficacy and self-direction may allow people to develop a view of life that increases importance of other activities relative to work. The result is lower centrality relative to individuals in residing in societies where education is less accessible.

Countries such as the U.S., that have more accessible educational systems tend to value involvement in activities (voluntary participation), commitment (e.g., self-esteem and educational aspirations), and student's interests (Meyer & Baker, 1996) rather than just achievement. This results in less competition and may even conceal the students' relative failure to achieve. Consequently, armed with higher self-concepts and confidence in their occupational aspirations, they tend to develop a balanced view of work and life. It seems plausible to argue that countries that have more elitist and inaccessible educational systems tend to place more emphasis on competition and achievement (i.e., achievement in science and mathematics, Baker, 1993). Hence, those who reside in countries with highly inaccessible educational systems may need to become more involved in work to survive. Involvement with work may be the way to progress and to survive the intense competition.

Economic System. The social institution that had the next greatest impact on work centrality was the degree of socialism in the economic system, as measured by the percentage of government expenditures. As expected, higher levels of socialism were associated with lower work centrality. This seems to confirm our argument that higher levels of governmental intervention likely

reduce opportunities typical of more capitalist societies and thereby discourage more involvement with work.

Another explanation for the negative relationship focuses on processes of institutional changes that occur when countries move from socialism to more capitalistic systems (Nee, 1989; 1991). In more socialist states, the government provides various redistributive benefits (e.g., health care, welfare, housing) instead of monetary rewards (e.g., income). In such socialist states, there are also various "destratification" policies that discourage initiative. Socialist governments also guarantee jobs. These processes encourage individuals to become dependent on the state knowing that their work and wages are guaranteed. Consequently, there is less necessity for individuals to be involved in work in order to survive.

However, as the economy moves more toward capitalism, individuals rely less on the state but also are offered more opportunities. As the economy moves towards capitalism, there is an increase in economic transactions (governed by the forces of the market). In general, the increase in economic transactions is also accompanied by an increase in opportunities for everyone. Consequently, given the market forces coupled with more opportunities, individuals have to recourse to more work involvement to survive.

Labor Relations. Similar to the governmental component of the economic system, the labor relations system as measured by union density had the third most influential effect on work centrality. As expected, results showed a negative relationship between union strength and work centrality. This provides

some support for our assertion that the labor unions' aims to better the conditions of their members and to reduce the general workload also lead to work being less central in one's lives.

In addition, union socialization may also reduce work centrality. Countries with stronger labor unions are more likely to have individuals exposed to unions and their goals. It is well–accepted that the early exposure and socialization experiences in labor unions tend to be consistently and positively associated with union attitudes (Fullagar, McCoy, & Shull, 1992) and union commitment (Gordon, Philpot, Burr, Thompson, & Spiller, 1980). This exposure is also more likely to result in a collective socialization relative to countries that have weaker labor unions. In turn, the exposure then elicits what Child, Loveridge, & Warner (1973) terms as "cardholding" members. That is, this collective socialization can result in individuals feeling committed to the union and their goals even though they are not actively participating in union activities (Jones, 1986; VanMaanen & Schein, 1979). Consequently, with their traditional goals of bettering off their members and natural resistance against 'overwork', labor unions can encourage their members to develop lower work centrality. In other words, consistent with their positive attitudes toward labor unions, individuals may actually maintain lower work centrality to show their commitment to their trade unions.

Social Inequality. As expected, there was an inverse relationship between the level of socioeconomic inequality and work centrality. A high level of inequality implies that only a few high positioned individuals have the opportunity to gain certain work-related advantages (Kohn et al., 1997). These

work-related advantages include a greater opportunity to be self-directed in one's work, to work at jobs that are more complex, and to have jobs that are not under close supervision (Kohn, 1969). This occupational self-direction can result in more attachment and involvement in one's work. Because countries with lower levels of social inequality have these opportunities available to more individuals, it is plausible that these individuals develop higher work centrality. In contrast, only a few individuals have these opportunities in high inequality countries, and the result is fewer individuals developing occupational self-direction and work involvement.

Another explanation for lower work centrality is the effects of high inequality on creativity. Conflict social theorists argue that only a few individuals have control over valuable resources in countries with high social inequality (Dahrendorf, 1959; Marx, 1956). In general, the few also ensure that the disadvantaged members of society are thoroughly controlled, exploited, and socialized so that they do not create any conflict over these resources. This control is also reflected in regulations controlling the workplace. If the role of rules are considered in the creative process, then there is a potential link between social inequality and work centrality.

A number of researchers have shown that contextual settings that provide opportunities and avoid constraints foster more creativity (Amabile, 1988; Amabile & Gryskiewicz, 1987; Drazin, Glynn. & Kazanjian, 1999; Oldham & Cummings, 1996). It seems plausible to argue that countries that have high social inequality rely on control rules that can be stifling and constraining. The

existence of rules can actually discourage creativity. In contrast, countries that have low social inequality provide more opportunities and less constraint. Therefore, it is plausible to argue that countries that have high social inequality are, on average, less likely to foster creativity than countries that have low inequality. If it is accepted that there is a link between creativity and work involvement, then it can be argued that the more 'creative' countries (i.e., low social inequality) have individuals who are more involved with work relative to individuals in less 'creative' countries.

Industrialization. Finally, the level of economic development had the smallest effect on work centrality. As hypothesized, the level of economic development was positively associated with work centrality. This supports our assertion that the likely value shift toward universalism, where occupational roles are determined more by achievement and less by ascription, gives individuals more opportunities to advance socially – hence leading to higher work centrality.

A second potential explanation is provided by research on well-being and job involvement (Kanungo, 1982; Lawler & Hall, 1970). Treiman (1970) argues that higher industrialization is typically accompanied by more mass communication, greater urbanization, and more geographical mobility. These changes usually result in more opportunities for individuals. Taking advantage of these opportunities may lead to more satisfaction of individual needs and to a higher sense of well-being. In contrast the lack of opportunities in less industrialized countries may not provide the important satisfaction of need, leading to work alienation (Kanungo, 1983). Through this perspective, it can be

argued that individuals in more industrialized nations have more opportunities that contribute to their well-being. This well-being, in turn, translates in more involvement with work, hence higher work centrality.

Regulative, Normative, and Cognitive Effects. Although a cognitive social institution, in this case education, had the greatest effect on individual work centrality, our results show that all three types of social institutions have dramatic effects on work centrality. As such, there is no support for our assertion of cognitive social institutions being more powerful.

Social Institutions and Work Outcomes

State/Government. In contrast to our expectations, higher levels of socialism were linked to higher levels of economic work outcomes and lower levels of expressive work outcomes. In other words, individuals in socialist countries preferred economic work outcomes more than individuals in capitalist countries, while individuals in more capitalist countries preferred expressive work outcomes more than individuals in socialist countries.

Although these findings were counter to our original arguments, there are possible explanations for such results. Several scholars have suggested that economic distribution in socialist economies (using China as example) is governed less by market transactions and more by bureaucratic channels (Oberschall, 1996; Parish & Michelson, 1996; Walder, 1995c). The state has substantial influence in its role in the "redistributive economy" (Zhou, Tuma, & Moen, 1997). However, it seems plausible to argue that, with the globalization of the world, individuals in socialist economies have access to information from

more capitalist societies. The opulence and private consumption typical of many of the capitalist economies may actually influence individuals to reconsider the role of economic outcomes relative to other expressive outcomes. In other words, individuals in socialist countries prefer economic work outcomes because they imitate individuals in more capitalist economies (consider for example, the case of former East Germany and the role of information in bringing the collapse of the socialist regime) and rebel against the influential role played by the socialist state in setting wages and controlling the economy. In addition, even the most socialist countries have been undergoing changes where a higher market orientation is being taken (Nee, 1989). In such cases, although the government is still heavily involved in the economy, there are deliberate attempts to infuse the economy with doses of entrepreneurial ventures and incentives for private profits, resulting in economic outcomes becoming more attractive.

Why do individuals in more capitalist societies prefer expressive work outcomes rather than economic outcomes? Inglehart, Basanez, & Moreno (1998) argue that the advanced industrial societies are now changing their basic values systems. In the new postmodern society, there is a shift from "materialist" values emphasizing economic achievement to an increasing emphasis on "post-materialist" values such as individual self-expression and quality of life concerns. These value changes explain why individuals in more capitalist countries view expressive work outcomes as more important. Expressive work outcomes reflect quality of life issues on the job (e.g., meeting people, having an interesting job) rather than mere materialist aspects of the job. As values of capitalist societies

shift from "materialist" values to "post-materialist" values, it seems inevitable that these changes would also be reflected in individuals viewing expressive work outcomes (i.e., post-materialist values – quality of life) as more important than economic work outcomes (i.e., materialist – income).

Labor Relations. Similar to the findings for the state/government hypotheses, both hypotheses relating labor relations to work outcomes were rejected. Results show that individuals in countries with strong labor unions prefer economic work outcomes, while individuals in countries with weak labor unions prefer expressive work outcomes.

How can such results be explained? In general, countries that have strong labor unions also have unions that play an active part in the formation and administration of macroeconomic policy, primarily reflected in wage-setting (Western, 1994). However, it is also argued that the stronger the unions are, the more concentrated their actions (Wallerstein et. Al., 1997). This concentration of actions implies that unions work with each other to control individual wages. However, it is argued that when labor unions act collectively, they tend to accept greater wage restraint than if they were acting independently. In other words, this concentration of actions can actually result in less than desirable wages. In such cases, it is very probable that individuals in countries residing in countries that have strong trade unions may still prefer economic work outcomes because their unions fight only for sub-optimal wages. They still value economic work outcomes because their wages do not really reflect the forces of the market. Also, some have even argued that centralized wage-setting suffers many of the

same failures as central planning, thereby explaining similar results to the state/government.

In contrast, in countries with weaker trade unions, individuals typically receive wages that reflect market conditions rather than being set centrally. It seems likely to argue that wages that are set by market forces may paint a more accurate picture of individuals' contributions and efforts rather than wages that are centrally set. Also, market wages may be more differentiated and allow a more precise renumeration of workers' contributions and efforts. Consequently, individuals in countries with weaker trade unions may be more satisfied with their market wages relative to individuals in countries with stronger trade unions. Hence, pursuit of expressive work outcomes may become more relevant.

Industrialization, Social Inequality, and Education. Results of the hypothesized relationship between industrialization, social inequality, and education did not show any effects of these social institutions on preference for a specific work outcome. For example, higher levels of industrialization were associated positively both with expressive and economic work outcomes. In other words, people from more industrialized countries had preferences for both economic and expressive work outcomes. Higher industrialization accompanied by higher economic work outcomes is reasonable because the value shift occurring in more industrialized nations place more emphasis on economic achievements rather than ascription, thereby placing more value on economic work outcomes. However, higher levels of industrialization associated with higher levels of expressive outcomes seem counterintuitive. One explanation

may be provided by the shift to "postmaterialist" values where there is an emphasis on quality of life and individual self-expression (Abramson & Inglehart, 1995). Also, it seems likely that the general level of affluence of more industrialized societies would encourage individuals to seek both types of work outcomes.

Higher levels of educational accessibility were also positively related to both economic and expressive work outcomes. As hypothesized, more accessible educational systems give individuals more opportunities to achieve their goals. This availability of opportunities encourages people to pursue economic work outcomes because they know that their efforts will be rewarded. However, more accessible educational systems also provide more opportunities for people to develop self-direction (Kohn, 1979) and the belief that they can achieve their life's goals. As argued earlier, this may encourage people to also seek expressive work outcomes rather than just economic work outcomes. It seems likely that expressive work outcomes can also contribute to the sense of self-direction and accomplishment.

Finally, as hypothesized, individuals in countries with lower social inequality gave more importance to economic outcomes. The latter is consistent with the argument that in countries with low levels of social inequality, individuals have more opportunities and can pursue economic work outcomes. Given the importance of economic outcomes in such countries, it is not expected that individuals in these countries pursue economic outcomes. However, I also hypothesized that individuals in countries with high social inequality prefer

expressive work outcomes. The latter was not supported. There was no relationship between higher levels of social inequality and expressive work outcomes. Possibly, the demoralizing effects of high social inequality may potentially make all aspects of work outcomes unimportant.

National Culture, Work Centrality and Work Outcomes

Results showed that national culture variables did not explain any proportion of the variation in between-country work centrality and work outcomes above and beyond individual factors. Consequently, none of the national culture hypotheses were supported. These results suggest that, against all expectations, social institutions were more powerful in explaining the individual level variables considered in this study. However, these results also suggest the possibility that national culture variables have indirect effects through social institutions.

These results are consistent with Parboteeah, Cullen, Victor, & Sakano's (1999) study. In that study, the researchers argued that national culture variables had a major influence on the types of ethical climates that existed in the countries under study. For example, they hypothesized that the more collectivist nature of Japanese culture would lead to more benevolence, while the individualist nature of U.S. culture would lead to more egoism. However, results showed the opposite. The U.S. had higher benevolence and lower egoism than did the Japanese. A more careful investigation of the results revealed that institutions (in this case, the rules and regulations governing accountants) were more powerful in explaining the results than national culture. The existence of

very powerful institutions in the U.S. implied that certain undesirable and potentially detrimental aspects of U.S. society for accountanst (i.e., individualism) were muted by the institutions. In other words, these institutions controlled any self-interested behavior typical of individualist cultures.

Implications of Findings for Control Variables

All four control variables included in this study had significant effects on the dependent variables. Specifically, results for gender and age supported a wealth of previous research. Consequently, given the findings, future cross-national research should take into consideration these individual factors.

On a different note, future researchers should also make greater efforts to include 'parallel' variables, i.e., using country level factors controlling for parallel individual level factors. For example, by showing that even when I controlled for union membership, country level union strength had an impact on the dependent variables, I made a stronger case for the existence of country or contextual effects. Future cross-national research would be well advised to take a similar approach.

Limitations

Despite the encouraging findings, the present study suffered some limitations and results should be viewed accordingly. First, all individual measures were obtained as part of the World Values Survey (World Values Study Group [1994]). Although this survey provided the benefit of extensive cross-national data, the research expertise of the data-collection teams varied from country to country. This might have affected the quality of the data

collected. Second, because I relied on secondary data, I had no control over construction of the measures. For example, several items were measured by two-point scales only thereby reducing variance. Most variables had fewer items than recommended for good measures. Nevertheless, I took appropriate measures to 'clean' the data. I checked each country separately for reliability of my measures, sample statistics, and distribution and removed countries when measurement seemed to fail.

Another possible limitation of the dissertation is that I ignored possible interactions among the social institutions and among the national culture variables. Consider, for example, Treiman's (1970) assertion that as countries industrialize, there is a breakdown in class structure rigidity and an increased emphasis on education. Or, Hostede's (1984) clustering of countries on pairs of national culture dimensions. These assertions and approaches would imply that there is a possible interaction among both social institutions and national culture variables. However, given the novelty of the present study, it was more beneficial to ignore possible interactions and present more focused theoretical arguments linking social institutions and national culture to the dependent variables. Also, this limitation provides some suggestions for future research where such interactions can be take into consideration.

Another possible limitation of the study is that it I assumed that all relationships in this study were linear. However, some possibilities of non-linearity exist. For example, it is possible that there is an inverted U curve relationship between industrialization and work centrality. As countries

industrialize, work centrality first increases, then reaches a peak, and subsequently decreases. However, given the novelty of the study and the newness of HLM as a statistical technique, assumptions of linear relationships are warranted. Future studies could also address such issues.

Managerial Implications

Results of this study have some serious implications for managers. In general, management education has focused on national culture whereby managers learn the implications of differences in national culture variables. However, present results imply that just considering national culture differences may not be sufficient. Managers would be well advised in considering the role of social institutions in shaping individual attitudes and behaviors. In fact, although the study was done at a country-level, because of the use of individual factors, some implications can be made at the individual level. For example, at the national level, social equality was positively correlated with work centrality. If international managers were to follow the implications of such findings, they should ensure that they treat all workers equally (e.g., salary, benefits, and so on). Another example pertains to the negative association between socialism and work centrality. Given that many companies are currently operating in socialist countries, managers of such companies would be well advised to provide opportunities to their workers in order to show that hard work is rewarded. If such actions are taken, workers will gradually understand that their involvement with work is valued and that they do not have to depend on the government to survive.

In general, results also show that the availability of opportunities at the country level is positively correlated with work centrality. For example, higher levels of capitalism, and higher levels of equality are both synonymous with availability of opportunities. Consequently, at an individual level, international managers should provide similar opportunities (i.e., benefits, more complex jobs etc.) in order to get workers more involved.

The present study also has some implications for some of the changes that are affecting the world. Consider for example, some of the radical changes occurring in China (Zhou, Tuma, & Moen, [1997]) or Poland and Ukraine (Kohn, Slomczynski, Janicka, & Khmelko, [1997]) where there is a transition from socialism to a market economy. Studies, mostly from a sociological perspective, showed that these changes are dramatically affecting the workplace (Bian, 1992; Davis, 1994; Walder, 1992). How can managers understand the implications of these changes if they use the static national culture dimensions? Although social institutional change was not explicitly addressed, the present dissertation nevertheless presents a novel framework where managers can consider relevant changes in selected social institutions and their impact on individuals.

Finally, results of this study have some serious implication for public policies concerning the effects of social institutions on work centrality. Given that most societies are interested in progress (which can usually be achieved through higher productivity and higher work involvement), results of the present study show that most social institutions have dramatic influence on work centrality. Consequently, public policies consistent with results can be implemented in order

to achieve the desired work centrality. For example, if deliberate attempts are made to reduce social inequality, work centrality can potentially increase.

Conclusions and Contributions

In general, the results supported the major premise of the dissertation that contextual effects do exist and social institutions have an impact on individuals even if relevant individual-level variables are controlled. The dissertation and results provided a possible approach that can address some of the concerns of OB researchers that OB studies have placed a disproportionate emphasis on individual factors at the expense of the context (Erez, 1990). Also, the cross-level approach is very timely given the importance of such issues in the field (Klein, Tosi, & Canella Jr., 1999).

The results of the study are encouraging with respect to finding relationships between social institutions and individual work-related attitudes. Although social institutions have often been ignored in comparative management research in favor of a focus on national culture, results showed that social institutions explain an impressive amount of variance in the dependent variables above and beyond individual factors. Results also showed that social institutions are more powerful than national culture variables in explaining country differences. Such results should be carefully considered in the light of future cross-national studies. Instead of relying primarily on national culture frameworks, such as Hofstede's (1984), researchers should also consider potential effects of social institutions.

Results also showed that there is a possible fruitful marriage between national culture variables and social institutions in future cross-national studies. By carefully understanding theoretically relevant social institutions and the relationship with national culture, more powerful models can be built. These new models will be more powerful in explaining cross-national differences because they will be more dynamic in nature.

Finally, an additional contribution of our study is a demonstration of the use of Hierarchical Linear Modeling (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992) as a technique to investigate cross-level relationships of social institutions with individual-level outcomes. This endeavor is very timely given that multi-level modeling is becoming more popular, as evidenced by the whole issue of the Academy of Management Review (April 1999) devoted to multi-level theory building. It is hoped that this study will encourage the use of HLM as a statistical technique to address some of the difficulties inherent in cross-level research with social institutions (see Klein, Tosi, & Canella, Jr., [1999] for a general description of such difficulties).

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APPENDIX A

Countries and sample size

Country	N
Argentina	1001
Belgium	2792
Britain	1484
Bulgaria	1034
Canada	1730
Chile	1500
China	1000
Czechoslovakia	1396
Denmark	1030
Finland	588
France	1002
West Germany	2201
Norway	1239
India	2500
Ireland	1000
Italy	2010
Japan	1011
South Korea	1251
Mexico	1531
Netherlands	1017
Nigeria	939
Poland	938
Portugal	1185
Russia	1961
Spain	2637
Turkey	1030
U.S.A.	1839

APPENDIX B

Items for Dependent Variables

Work Centrality (4 point scale)
1. Please say how important is the following in your life
Work
2. Here are some statements about why people work. Which one comes closest to what you think?
I enjoy my work, it's the most important thing in my life

Economic Work and Expressive Work Outcomes (2 point scale)
Here are some aspects of work that people say are important. Which ones do you personally think are important in a job?

Economic:
1. Good pay
2. Good job security
3. Good chances for promotion
4. Is a necessity

Expressive:
1. Allows me to meet pleasant people
2. Allows me to use initiative
3. Is useful to society
4. Is interesting
5. Meets my abilities

APPENDIX C

Factor Analysis

	Factor Loadings		
FACTORS	1	2	3
Work Centrality (α = 0.92)			
How important is work in your life?	**.54**	-.13	.04
Work is the most important thing in your life	**.44**	-.07	-.08
Regarding my work, I will always do my best	**.51**	-.34	.16
Economic Work Outcome (α = 0.80) I work because work			
Provides good pay	-.04	**.50**	.04
To get paid	-.05	**.42**	-.14
Is a necessity	-.21	**.48**	-.20
Gives good hours	-.06	**.51**	.39
Provides generous holidays	-.10	**.54**	.32
Expressive Work Outcome (α = 0.63) I work because work			
Allows me to meet pleasant people	-.13	.12	**.50**
Allows me to use initiative	-.02	-.14	**.73**
Is useful to society	.22	.03	**.57**
Allows me to achieve something	-.01	-.14	**.67**
Is interesting	-.18	-.00	**.64**
Meets my abilities	.03	-.02	**.59**